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Introduction
The American Association of Petroleum Landmen (AAPL) Form 610 Model Form
Operating Agreement' has been in use in the oil and gas industry in one form or
another since 1956. The various versions of the Model Form Operating Agreement
continue to be widely used. Reference to a joint operating agreement in the context
of an oil and gas matter normally concerns one of the versions of the Model Form
Operating Agreement.
Based upon an empirical analysis, it appears that ten years ago, relatively few
cases dealt specifically with the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement.
Within the last few years, however, a growing number of appellate decisions address
the Model Form Operating Agreement. These cases provide lawyers with some
insight and guidance concerning the interpretation and application of the various
versions of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement.
The following article provides a comprehensive analysis of various court decisions
that specifically address one of the versions of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form
Operating Agreement. Part I of this article begins with a brief historical accounting
of the development of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement. Part
H provides an analysis of the general relationship created by the Model Form
Operating Agreement between the designated operator and the non-operators. The
remainder of this article provides a discussion of court decisions interpreting specific
provisions of the Model Form Operating Agreement
L History of the Model Form Operating Agreement
Until 1956, no standard form operating agreement had been accepted and used in
the oil and gas industry. However, members of the industry made efforts during this
period to develop a standard agreement to be used in connection with oil and gas
operations. The following discussion provides a brief historical accounting of the
development of the Model Form Operating Agreement.
1. The AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement will, at times, be referred to as the
"Model Form Operating Agreement."
2. The specific provisions of the Model Form Operating Agreement will generally be discussed in
the order in which they appear in the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement.
2001]
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A. 1956 Version
The development of the Model Form Operating Agreement began in 1952, when
a group of oil and gas representatives, mostly landmen, from Tulsa and Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, decided to prepare a standard form of the operating agreement.3
This group invited many of the larger oil and gas companies to attend a meeting in
Tulsa, at which the parties would discuss the possibility of preparing a standardized
joint operating agreement. As a result of this meeting, the representatives appointed
a steering committee comprised of seven members, which met for two years in an
effort to prepare a model form agreement. Based on numerous forms of operating
agreements previously used by various oil and gas companies and after approximately
two years of drafting, the steering committee finalized a proposed form agreement
and presented it to a legal committee for review.4 After approximately two more
years of refinement, the agreement was ready to be presented to the oil and gas
industry.
In 1956, Mr. John Folks presented the form at the annual meeting of the American
Association of Petroleum Landmen held in Denver, Colorado. At about the same
time, the Ross-Martin Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma, distributed the 610 Form and
the COPAS Accounting Procedure to its several thousand individual and corporate
customers.5 The AAPL endorsed the agreement at the 1956 meeting; this endor-
sement marks the origin of the standardized operating agreement used by the oil and
gas industry today.
In 1967, the AAPL revised limited portions of the 1956 form. Also, as a result of
an agreement with the Ross-Martin Company, the AAPL changed the form name of
the agreement from the "Kraftbilt 610 Agreement" to "AAPL Form 610.6'
B. 1977, 1982, and 1989 Versions
Since the finalization of the original Model Form Operating Agreement in 1956,
the agreement has been substantially revised on various occasions. In 1977, a
restructuring and revision of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement resulted in
the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement. Thereafter, in 1982,
the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement was revised slightly, resulting in the
1982 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement Finally, in March 1986,
an operating agreement revision committee was formed at the request of then AAPL
President, Mr. Omar Humble, to consider further revisions to the 1982 version of the
Model Form Operating Agreement. Three attorneys and four landmen served on this
committee. The committee distributed the first working draft to representatives of
nine major oil and gas companies and one large independent oil and gas company
for review and discussion. After further refinement, the committee submitted the final
3. 3.0. Young, Oil and Gas Operating Agreements: Producers 88 Operating Agreements, Selected
Problems and Suggested Solutions, 20 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 197, 199 (1975).
4. Id. at 199-200.
5. Id. at 200.
6. Id.
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draft to the AAPL for approval, which resulted in the most recent version of the
Model Form Operating Agreement, the 1989 AAPL Form 610 Model Form
Operating Agreement.
II. The Relationship Between Operator and Non-Operators
One of the fundamental purposes of the Model Form Operating Agreement is to
establish and define the relationship between the operator and each of the non-
operators with regard to the development of the applicable lands covered by the
agreement. In Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources, Ltd,7 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi described the AAPL Form 610
Model Form Operating Agreement as follows:
Form 610 is a standard form agreement used frequently in joint oil
drilling ventures between Operators and Non-Operators that governs the
exploration and development of oil, gas and mineral leases and interests,
and covers, among other matters, the responsibilities of the Operator, the
expenditures and liabilities of the Operator and the Non-Operator, the
payment of royalties and the procedures for exploration, drilling and
development
Each version of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement
specifically states that the liability of the parties is to be several, not joint or
collective. Each party is responsible only for its proportionate share of the costs of
developing and operating within the applicable lands Each version of the Model
Form Operating Agreement generally provides that it is neither the intention of the
parties to create, nor should the agreement be construed as creating a partnership or
other association, and that the parties are not to be held liable as partners or members
of any such association.'"
The 1989 version of the Model Form Operating Agreement specifically states that
the parties to the agreement are not to be considered fiduciaries or to have established
any type of confidential relationship." However, this agreement does provide that
the parties have an obligation to act in good faith in their dealings with each other
with respect to the activities under the agreement. 2 Although the various versions
7. 775 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Miss. 1991).
8. Id. at 971-72. See also Hill v. Heritage Resources Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 110-12 (Tex. App. - El
Paso 1997, no writ), for a detailed description of the purpose of a Model Form Operating Agreement.
9. Model Form Operating Agreement art. VII.A (Am. Ass'n of Petroleum Landmen) (Form 610-
1989) [hereinafter 1989 Model Form]; Model Form Operating Agreement art. VII.A (Am. Ass'n of
Petroleum Landen) (Form 610-1982) [hereinafter 1982 Model Form]; Model Form Operating
Agreement art. VII.A (Am. Ass'n of Petroleum Landmen) (Form 610-1977) [hereinafter 1977 Model
Form]; Model Form Operating Agreement § 22 (Am. Ass'n of Petroleum Landmen) (Form 610-1956)
[hereinafter 1956 Model Form].
10. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.A; 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.A;
1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.A; 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 22.
11. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.A; 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.A;
1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.A; 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 22.
12. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VIL.A; 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.A;
20011
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of the Model Form Operating Agreement expressly provide that the agreement does
not create a mining or other partnership and that the parties are not liable as partners,
courts interpreting these provisions have generally adopted three different approaches
to analyzing the relationship created by the Model Form Operating Agreement. These
courts also, in their analysis of the agreement, distinguish between the relationship
of the operator to the non-operators and the relationship of the non-operators to third
parties. Specifically, courts distinguish the relationship of the non-operators to third-
party creditors who have provided services at the request of the operator in the
development of the lands under the agreement.
A. Approach 1: Fiduciary Duty Created by the Agreement
In certain decisions, courts have refused to give effect to the specific language in
the Model Form Operating Agreement, which language disavows the creation of a
fiduciary relationship between or among the parties to the agreement. In these cases,
courts nevertheless impose duties and obligations upon the parties that are fiduciary
in nature. One of the most frequently cited cases dealing with the relationship of the
operator and the non-operators under the Model Form Operating Agreement is
Reserve Oil, Inc. v. Dixon.3
1. Trustee-Type Relationship Created
Reserve Oil concerned the 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating
Agreement. In this case, the lower court dismissed the action, holding that the Model
Form Operating Agreement did not create a fiduciary relationship between the
parties, did not create an agency relationship between the parties, and did not create
any obligation to return specific money, which was alleged to have been converted."'
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the lower court's analysis of
the Model Form Operating Agreement, holding that the agreement created a trustee-
type relationship and imposed a duty of fair dealing between the operator and the
non-operators."5 In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court discussed the
various provisions of the Model Form Operating Agreement which the court found
as the basis for such trustee-type relationship. 6
1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.A; 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 22.
13. 711 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1983).
14. Id. at 953.
15. Id.
16. The court stated:
The contract vests ownership of the oil and gas produced from the wells in the parties
in the same percentage that they own interests in the well. The contract also grants the
owners the right to dispose of their oil and gas as they see fit - that is, by taking it in
kind or selling it themselves. "In the event any party shall fail to make the arrangements
necessary to... dispose of its proportionate share of the oil and gas produced from the
[well], Operator shall have the right.. . , but not the obligation, to purchase such oil and
gas or sell it .... " The contract also provides for the sharing of the costs and expenses
of operating the well. It authorizes the operator to bill the other parties in advance for
their proportionate shares of the estimated costs to be incurred during the succeeding
month and requires each party to pay its estimated share of costs within fifteen days from
[Vol. 54:211
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Based upon the various provisions of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement,
the court found that the contract did not simply create an indebtedness of the operator
to pay to the other owners their share of the profits from the well production."
Rather, the Model Form Operating Agreement gave each party ownership and full
control over its proportionate share of the oil and gas." Under the agreement, the
operator had the right to invade the non-operator's province only when the non-
operator failed to dispose of its own production; additionally, this right was revocable
by the non-operator." Further, the court explained that if the operator exercised its
right to dispose of the owners production, the operator could take the proceeds from
the sale of the production for its own use only to the extent necessary to cover the
non-operator's unpaid proportionate share of the costs of production.'
The court remarked that the operator had no right to or interest in either the oil
and gas itself, or the proceeds from sales beyond the non-operator's unpaid
proportionate share of the costs.2 Based on this interpretation of the Model Form
Operating Agreement, the court concluded that the agreement created a trustee-type
relationship, imposing a duty of fair dealing between the operator and the non-
operator.' However, the court stated that it did not "mean to imply that there is a
general agency relationship as to third parties, which, of course, is specifically
disavowed in the contract itself."'
In reaching its conclusion concerning the trustee-type relationship under the Model
Form Operating Agreement, the appellate court relied upon the decision of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit.' In Young,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the operator of a secondary recovery unit
established under the police power of the state by the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission stood as a fiduciary in relation to the royalty owners in the unit.' The
distinction between Young and Reserve Oil is that in Reserve Oil the Tenth Circuit
interpreted a voluntary, private agreement, while in Young the Oklahoma Supreme
Court considered the relationship between parties created through the exercise of the
police power of the state under the applicable Oklahoma statutes by the Oklahoma
receipt of the estimate. If any party fails to pay, the operator is granted a preferred lien
in, inter alia, the delinquent party's oil and gas or the proceeds from its sale. The operator
is also authorized to collect the delinquent party's share of costs directly from that party's
purchasers, out of the sale proceeds, up to the amount owed by that party. The contract
establishes a joint account to keep track of the costs and to credit against them the
amounts paid into the fund by the owners.
Id. at 952-53 (alterations in original) (citations and footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 953.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954).
25. Id. at 309-10.
2001]
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Corporation Commission. Thus, the Tenth Circuit erred in relying on this Oklahoma
case.
In Leck v. Continental Oil Co.,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court reinforced the
concept of a fiduciary or trustee-type duty being imposed on an operator as espoused
in Young. The court decided the issue of whether the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate an action brought by mineral interest owners against the
operator of such owners' unit seeking damages based on the operator's alleged breach
of a fiduciary duty. The mineral interest owners argued that the operator breached
its fiduciary duty by allowing the mineral interest owners' correlative rights to be
violated by not protecting their unit from uncompensated drainage caused by an
offset well operated by the operator 7
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that it had previously recognized the
existence of a fiduciary duty owed by a unit operator to the royalty owners and
lessees who were either parties to a unitization agreement or subject to the order
* creating the unit? The court determined that this duty was created not by the lease
agreement, but rather by the unitization order and agreement.' The court concluded
that it was incumbent upon the mineral interest owners to show what, if any,
violation of the fiduciary duty occurred under the lease agreement.'
2. Overpayments to Operator by Non-Operator Held in Trust
In In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc.," the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals again
considered the relationship between an operator and non-operators under a joint
operating agreement?2 Mahan & Rowsey concerned an operator who overbilled a
non-operator for the non-operator's share of the well costs. The operator filed a
petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The non-operator filed an action
in the bankruptcy court attempting to recover the overpayments.
Relying on Reserve Oil, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the bankruptcy
court's ruling that the operating agreement between the parties created a trustee-type
relationship.3 Thus, the court concluded that the operator held the overpayments in
trust for the non-operator?' In this regard, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated:
The principal issue is whether the district court correctly held that
a trust arose out of the conduct of the parties. We conclude the district
26. 800 P.2d 224 (Okla. 1989).
27. Ld. at 225.
28. Id at 229. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited the holdings in Young, Reserve Oil, West
Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Young, 325 P.2d 1047 (Okla. 1958), and Olansen v. Texaco, Inc., 587 P.2d
976 (Okla. 1978).
29. Leck, 800 P.2d at 229.
30. Id.
31. 817 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1987).
32. It is difficult to determine from the opinion whether the decision involved the Model Form
Operating Agreement.
33. Mahan & Rowsey, 817 F.2d at 684.
34. 1&
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court was right. We noted in Reserve Oil that an operating agreement
of the type present in this case created a "trustee type relationship
imposing a duty of fair dealing between the operator and the non-
operator owners in the matter of distribution of the shares among the
owners." What results from the fiduciary relationship thereby created
is a constructive trust imposed on the operator. Because money was
given to the operator for a particular purpose (for example, the
payment of a debt), the operator received the money in trust to apply
it to the intended purpose. 5
The court concluded that because of the fiduciary relationship imposed upon the
operator by the operating agreement and other equitable considerations, the operator
had an obligation to properly bill the non-operator and to pay the sums received only
for the non-operator's share of the completion and operating expenses.' Therefore,
the non-operator could trace the trust funds into the commingled funds of the
operator 7 The court cautioned that only the lowest balance in the commingled
account in the operator's possession prior to the date of bankruptcy was subject to the
constructive trust.3
3. Operator's Acquisition of Interest in Derogation of Non-Operator's Title Held
in Trust
In Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc.,9 the Arkansas Supreme
Court considered the relationship between the operator and the non-operator under
a joint operating agreement. The parties entered into an operating agreement in
1981. The non-operator provided various abstracts and title opinions to the operator.
After reviewing the abstracts and title opinions, the operator determined that the oil
and gas lease acquired by the non-operator did not include all of the interests of a
decedent in the subject lands. The operator, without notice to the non-operator,
acquired a lease from the true owners contrary to the leasehold interest of the non-
operator.
The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determination that the joint
operating agreement created a fiduciary relationship between the operator and the
non-operator.4' In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the operating
agreement created a joint venture between the operator and the non-operator even
though such joint venture did not exhibit every element of a partnership. 2 The
parties' relationship was one of trust and confidence that resulted from their execution
35. Id. (quoting Reserve Oi, 711 F.2d at 953).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. d at 685.
39. 668 S.W.2d 16 (Ark. 1984).
40. It is difficult to determine from the decision whether the case involved a Model Form Operating
Agreement.
41. Texas Oil, 668 S.W.2d at 17.
42. Id.
20011
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of the joint operating agreement.43 Because of this relationship, the operator owed
a duty of fair dealing to the non-operator." Thus, the operator held the oil and gas
lease acquired in derogation of the interest of the non-operator in trust for the non-
operator!'
The first line of cases, therefore, appears to disregard the specific language of
various versions of the Model Form Operating Agreement and focuses on the
substance of the relationship between the parties, finding a trustee-type or fiduciary
relationship.
B. Approach 2: Fiduciary Relationship Limited by Agreement
In the second line of decisions addressing the Model Form Operating Agreement,
courts have found that the operating agreement may, in some instances, create ajoint
venture, partnership, or other arrangement that normally establishes some type of
fiduciary relationship. However, according to these decisions, the Model Form
Operating Agreement creates a standard of conduct by which to measure the
operator's actions vis-A-vis the non-operator, which is less than a typical fiduciary
standard. The courts in these particular cases have not held the parties to a fiduciary
standard, but to the standard of conduct agreed to and set forth in the operating
agreement.
1. Joint Venture Created, but Fiduciary Duty Limited by Agreement
In Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard," the non-operator claimed the operator violated
the joint operating agreement7 because the operator failed to disclose geological and
geophysical information pertaining to the oil structures that were being developed
under the joint operating agreement. Furthermore, the non-operator alleged that the
joint operating agreement created a joint venture, which in turn created a fiduciary
relationship. The non-operator asserted that the operator breached his fiduciary duty
because of the operator's alleged misrepresentation of the potential productivity of the
field to the north and east of the area developed, when the field was subsequently
shown to be productive to the south and east.
In analyzing the non-operator's allegations, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the agreements between the parties created a joint venture, resulting in a
fiduciary relationship." In this regard, the court remarked:
43. Id.
44. Id
45. Id.; see also Mud Control Lab. v. Covey, 269 P.2d 854, 859 (Utah 1954) (holding that pursuant
to the terms of the parties'joint operating agreement [not an AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating
agreement], a mining partnership existed and the non-operator was liable as a partner for the debts
incurred by the mining partnership).
46. 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1960).
47. While Frankfort Oil does not appear to address the Model Form Operating Agreement, the
courts analysis has been applied in subsequent decisions interpreting the Model Form Operating
Agreement. See, e.g., Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bogert, 630 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
48. Frankfort Oil, 279 F.2d at 443. These agreements consisted of four different contracts between
the parties concerning the development of the lands in question.
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By their November 11, 1954, contracts the parties entered into a
common undertaking involving jointly-owned property and a sharing of
the profits. They were engaged in a joint adventure. The relationship so
created was fiduciary in character and required the utmost good faith on
the part of both parties. The extent and effect of such relationship is
determined by the written agreements between the parties defining and
delineating the powers and rights of each. In such a situation, it is
presumed that they delegated all the powers they wished to confer upon
each other and withheld all powers or authority not affirmatively
delegated. The relationships between them are controlled by the terms
of their agreements voluntarily made.49
In analyzing the non-operator's assertion that the operator had breached its
fiduciary duty by withholding geological and geophysical information, the court
stated that the operator did not have a contractual obligation to divulge that
information under the joint operating agreement.' The contracts between the parties
did entitle the non-operator to certain information, but the non-operator did not claim
that such information was withheld from him." The court concluded that the non-
operator was requesting the court to rewrite the parties' agreements, and that this
request clearly exceeded the court's power.'
Interestingly, the court determined that the non-operator's assertion that the
operator violated its fiduciary duty by misrepresenting the facts as to the preferred
development of the area was unfounded.' While the operator attempted to justify
its opinion that the field lay to the north, the non-operator insisted that the field
developed to the south.M The fact that the non-operator's opinion was substantiated
by later drilling showed that the non-operator had better judgment than the
operator." However, the opinions and conclusions of the operator did not breach
any contractual fiduciary duty unless these opinions and conclusions resulted in some
overreaching of the non-operator.' In this case, the court concluded that there was
no overreaching.'
2. Joint Venture Created, but Agreement Limits Duty to Drill Additional Well
In Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bogert," the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma adopted the analysis in Frankfort Oil to analyze the provisions
of what appears to be the 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement.
In Tenneco, the parties entered into an operating agreement covering Section 4 and
49. 1&
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 443-44.
53. Id. at 444.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 630 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
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the designated operator drilled a productive well in the section. Shortly thereafter, the
operator drilled and completed a well in adjoining Section 3, completing such well
in the same formation from which the well in Section 4 was producing.
The non-operator under the applicable joint operating agreement did not know of
the drilling of the well in Section 3. Upon learning of such well, the non-operator
claimed that the well was draining Section 4. The non-operator asserted that the
operator had a duty under the joint operating agreement to drill an increased density
well in Section 4 to protect such section from drainage by the well in Section 3.
Because the operator failed to drill an increased density well, the non-operator
alleged that the operator breached its fiduciary duty arising under the joint operating
agreement.
In assessing the duty of the operator to the non-operator, the court found that the
applicable joint operating agreement contained language that specifically proscribed
any joint or collective liability between the parties, and that disclaimed any intent of
the parties to create a partnership or render themselves liable as partners" The
court noted that in section 5 of the agreement, "Operator of the Unit Area," the
operator had an obligation to conduct all operations in a good and workmanlike
manner.' Pursuant to section 5, the operator was not liable to other parties for
losses sustained or liabilities incurred, except those losses which resulted from the
operator's gross negligence or breach of the provisions of the joint operating
agreement.!'
In analyzing the relationship of the parties under the joint operating agreement, the
court stated:
Even though the present joint operating agreement may be seen to
create a joint venture with attendant fiduciary duties, the court is mindful
that the term "fiduciary" is easily bandied-about without precision. "The
scope of the transactions affected by the relation and the extent of the
duties imposed are not identical in all fiduciary relations." In the case of
joint ventures to develop oil and gas properties, the law is well es-
tablished that the determination of the existence and extent of such duties
is controlled by the terms of the agreement between the parties.
The non-operator alleged that the operator violated the trust that the non-operator
placed in the operator and prevented the non-operator from taking corrective action
to prevent drainage to Section 4 by the well in Section 3 by withholding certain
information relating to the Section 3 well.' The court noted that section 14 of the
agreement, "Access to Unit Area," guaranteed the non-operator reasonable access to
"information pertaining to the development or operation" in Section 4. Under section
14 of the agreement, the operator was required, upon request from the non-operator,
59. lit at 966.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 967 (citations omitted).
63. I1&
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to furnish certain information." The agreement also specifically granted the non-
operator the right to perform an audit." The non-operator did not allege a breach
of any of these provisions." Rather, the non-operator sought to have the court
provide it with the benefit of information (i.e., the alleged drainage) that the operator
acquired from its operations in the adjoining section.'
The court declined to impose a duty on the operator under the Model Form
Operating Agreement to either share the requested information concerning the alleged
drainage or to drill another well in Section 4." Based on section 7, "Test Well,"
section 11, "Limitation on Expenditures," and section 12, "Operations By Less Than
All Parties" of the agreement, the operator and non-operator each had a specifically
defined and limited right to drill an additional well, with or without the other's
consent." These provisions, however, did not impose an obligation on the operator
to drill any well, with the exception of the test well specifically provided for in the
joint operating agreement."
The court concluded that given both the detailed provisions of the joint operating
agreement and the legal requirements for drilling an additional well, it had no basis
for reading into the parties' agreement a fiduciary duty obligating the operator to drill
an additional well simply because it had knowledge of drainage by the offset well in
the adjoining section.7 ' The operator and non-operator, as sophisticated participants
in the business of developing oil and gas properties, could not be presumed incapable
of including an express provision in their agreement to create the duty requested by
the non-operator had they so intended or desired.'
3. Duty of Good Faith Limited to Provisions of Agreement
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the concept of limiting the duties and obligations
of an operator to those set forth in the applicable joint operating agreement, as
discussed in Frankfort Oil. In Davis v. TXO Production Corp.,' the parties entered
into two joint operating agreements covering two drilling and spacing units.74 The
operator attempted to establish what appeared to be a secondary recovery unit that
would encompass the lands covered by the two joint operating agreements. Based on
64. Id. at 967-68.
65. Id. at 968.
66. Id.
67. Id. The adjoining section, being a different unit area, was not covered by the applicable joint
operating agreement.
68. Id. at 969.
69. Id. at 968-69.
70. Id. at 969. The court noted that the joint operating agreement could not eliminate the fact that
neither the operator nor the non-operator had any authority to drill the requested increased density well
in Section 4 until the Oklahoma Corporation Commission issued an increased density order authorizing
the drilling of the well. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 929 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1991).
74. It is unclear whether the joint operating agreements involved in Davis were Model Form
Operating Agreements.
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discussions between the non-operator and a lessor in certain oil and gas leases held
by the non-operator, the lessor withdrew his consent to the proposed plan of
unitization covering the proposed secondary recovery unit.
The operator alleged that the non-operator caused various lessors to sue the
operator, and that the non-operator provided technical expertise and information to
assist the lessors in these lawsuits. The operator sued the non-operator for breach of
an alleged implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed the operator under
the joint operating agreements.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's determination that,
based on the analysis in Frankfort Oil, under Oklahoma law there can be no breach
of an implied duty of good faith to perform under a joint operating agreement, absent
a breach of a specific contractual provision in the joint operating agreement.7 The
court noted that the operator did not dispute that the non-operator's actions did not
constitute a breach of any express provision in the joint operating agreement."
Rather, the operator based its cause of action on the existence of an implied duty of
good faith independent of any fiduciary duty between cotenants.' The operator
asserted that, as a general principle of contract law, neither party to a contract may
do anything to destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the
contract 8
In analyzing the operator's claims, the court concluded that the actions of the non-
operator did not destroy the operator's right to receive the benefits of the joint
operating agreements. 9 The joint operating agreements did not provide for a plan
of unitization for a secondary recovery unit or require the non-operator's cooperation
in such a scheme ° The joint operating agreements also did not prohibit the non-
operator from communicating its opinions concerning the proposed plan of unitization
to its lessors."' The operator failed to sufficiently allege that the non-operator's
actions injured the joint estate or otherwise deprived the operator of any fruits of the
joint operating agreements.' Consequently, the court declined to extend the duty of
cotenants (i.e., the duty of good faith and fair dealing) of an oil and gas lease beyond
the express provisions contained in the joint operating agreements.'
75. Davis, 929 F.2d at 1519.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also Andrau v. Mich. Wis. Pipe Line Co., 712 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1986). In Andrau, the
Wyoming Supreme Court followed the principles announced in Frankfort Oil and held that the parties
to the joint operating agreement had limited their fiduciary obligations by the specific contract provisions.
Andrau, 712 P.2d at 376-77. The court determined that the factual situation at issue in Andrau was
distinguishable from the facts involved in Reserve Oil and Young. Id. at 375; see also Connaghan v.
Maxus Exploration Co., 5 F.3d 1363, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that, under Wyoming law, the terms
of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement did not, expressly or impliedly, impose any fiduciary duty
on the operator).
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4. Joint Venture Created, with Contractual Standard of Conduct Less than a
Fiduciary Standard
In Dime Box Petroleum Corp. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration CO.," the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered the relationship, under Colorado law, of the
operator and non-operator under the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating
Agreement. In Dime Box, the parties had entered into one or more Model Form
Operating Agreements under which the plaintiff was the non-operator and the
defendant was the operator.
In analyzing the relationship of the parties, the Tenth Circuit found that under
Colorado law, a fiduciary relationship exists between parties to a joint venture."
Under Colorado law, three elements must exist to establish ajoint venture: (1) a joint
interest in property; (2) an express or implied agreement to share in the losses or
profits of the venture; and (3) conduct showing cooperation in the venture.' In this
case, the court specifically found that the parties had created a joint venture."
The court next considered whether the parties had contracted for a standard by
which to measure the operator's conduct rather than utilizing the standard imposed
upon a fiduciary." The court determined that under article V.A, "Designation and
Responsibilities of Operator," of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement, the
operator had no liability to the non-operator except as may arise from the operator's
gross negligence or willful misconduct." In other words, the operator had no
liability to the non-operator for negligence or unintentional misconduct." The court
found that "this measure of conduct bears no relationship to the yardstick used to
measure the conduct of a fiduciary.""'
The court determined that the operating agreement was a legitimate product of the
parties' negotiations' The non-operator did not allege that the joint operating
agreement was a contract of adhesion, that the parties had unequal bargaining power,
or that the operator utilized fraud or misrepresentation to induce the non-operator to
enter into the agreemen 3 The court concluded that the parties contracted for a
standard by which to measure the operator's conduct that differed from the standard
applicable to a fiduciary.'4 Therefore, even though the court recognized the Model
Form Operating Agreement as creating a joint venture, the court did not hold the
operator to a fiduciary standard. Instead, the court held the operator to the standard
of conduct contemplated in the agreements
84. 938 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1991).
85. Id. at 1146.
86. ld. at 1147.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id at 114748.
91. Id. at 1148.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1992). In Doheny, the Tenth
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C. Approach 3: Relationship Limited to Contractual Provisions - No Fiduciary
Duty
The third approach to the relationship of the operator and the non-operator under
the Model Form Operating Agreement is best illustrated by various Texas cases and
one Oklahoma case. In these cases, the courts have followed the express language
of the joint operating agreement, refusing to impose any type of implied obligation
into the agreement.
1. Texas
In Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.," the Texas Court of Appeals decided the
issue of whether the 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement
created a joint venture, with an accompanying fiduciary relationship. The resolution
of this issue turned on whether the parties to the joint operating agreement were
engaged in a joint venture.'
The court outlined the elements of a joint venture as follows: (1) mutual rights of
control; (2) community of interest; (3) the sharing of profits as principals; and (4) the
sharing of losses, costs, or expenses.9 With respect to the first element, mutual
rights of control, the court concluded that under the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement, the non-operators were wholly excluded from participation in the drilling,
operating, and control of the well in question, even though the non-operators paid
part of the cost of drilling the well and visited the well site." The court also found
that the operator had full control of all operations and that the parties were severally,
not jointly, liable under section 5, "Operator of Unit," and section 22, "Liability of
Parties," of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement."9 Therefore, as a matter
of law, the parties did not enter into a joint venture, and no form of fiduciary duty
existed between the parties."0 '
Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon its analysis in Dime Box in determining whether the joint operating
agreement (a non-model form operating agreement) at issue created a fiduciary duty under Wyoming law.
Doheny, 974 F.2d at 135. The court found that the duties alleged to have been breached were not duties
contemplated in the joint operating agreement; nor were these duties that naturally arose as corollaries
to the obligations contained in the agreement. Id. Therefore, plaintiffs did not show that the operator
owed duties (i.e., a fiduciary duty) other than those outlined in the operating agreement. Id. Also,
because the plaintiffs made no showing that the operator had breached a specific duty set out in the joint
operating agreement, they failed to raise a question of fact concerning the breach of any implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Id.; see also Oryx Energy Co. v. Tatex Energy, 779 F. Supp. 144 (D.
Colo. 1991). In Oryx, the court upheld certain provisions of ajoint operating agreement that limited the
liability of the operator to operations conducted in bad faith. Oryx, 779 F. Supp. at 146. The court noted
that the validity of agreements specifically limiting the liability of unit operators had been recognized
by both Oklahoma state courts and a United States federal court in Colorado. Id. (citing Dime Box and
Tenneco Oil).
96. 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
97. Id. at 321.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 355 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin
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However, the court did find that under section 5 of the 1956 Model Form
Operating Agreement, the operator had the duty to conduct all operations in a good
and workmanlike manner." Under the facts of such case, the appellate court found
that the operator did not perform his duties in a good and workmanlike manner,
constituting a material breach of the joint operating agreement" s
In Texstar North America, Inc. v. Ladd Petroleum Corp., " the Texas Court of
Appeals considered whether the 1982 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating
Agreement contained an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Under the joint
operating agreement in question, the operator had drilled and completed a producing
well. The non-operator had subsequently drilled another well in lands offsetting the
initial well, but in the same reservoir as the initial well.
The operator became concerned that the offset well was draining hydrocarbons
from the initial well. The operator proposed to fracture stimulate the initial well to
improve production and prevent drainage by the non-operator's offset well.
Under article VI.B.1, "Proposed Operations," and article VII.D.2, "Rework or Plug
Back," of the joint operating agreement, the operator could not conduct the fracture
stimulation on the initial well without the consent of all parties to the agreement. The
non-operator refused to consent to the proposed fracture stimulation. The operator
brought an action against the non-operator for breach of an alleged implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing under the joint operating agreement.
In analyzing the operator's allegations, the court found that articles VI.B.1 and
VII.D.2 of the joint operating agreement were clear, unambiguous, and set forth the
terms and conditions under which a well could be reworked or, in this case, fracture
stimulated." These provisions required that the operator obtain approval from all
of the non-operators prior to conducting such operations."
The court determined that the operator's reliance upon an implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing was without merit.' 7 The court pointed out that the operator
conceded that no Texas case supported its position that an implied duty of mutual
1962, writ granted), U.S. Truck Lines v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1960,
writ reid). In both Truck Lines and Youngstown, the Texas Court of Appeals determined that under the
subject joint operating agreements, the specific elements for a partnership or joint venture were absent,
those being the elements of mutual agency and joint operation. These cases did not deal with the Model
Form Operating Agreement. However, the concepts espoused in these cases have been subsequently
applied to the Model Form Operating Agreement by appellate courts in Texas.
102. Hamilton, 648 S.W.2d at 324.
103. d. The court noted that under section 5 of the joint operating agreement, the operator was
liable for damages resulting from acts constituting gross negligence or a breach of the provisions of the
joint operating agreement. Id. Having found that the conduct of the operator constituted a material
breach of the agreement, the court held that damages were properly awarded against the operator. Id.
104. 809 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
105. Id. at 677.
106. Id.
107. Id at 678. The court noted that the Texas Supreme Court had previously rejected the notion
that an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing existed in every contract. Id. at 677 (citing English
v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983)). The courts recognized this duty only when there was a "special
relationship" between the parties to the contract. Id.
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cooperation existed between working interest owners who were parties to a joint
operating agreement. Therefore, the court held that under articles VI.B.1 and
VII.D.2 of the 1982 Model Form Operating Agreement, which expressly and
unambiguously provided the terms under which a party could withhold consent to a
rework procedure, no implied covenant existed to the contrary."9
In Johnston v. American Cometra, Inc.,"0 the non-operators sued the operator
under a 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement for the operator's
alleged failure to make take-or-pay claims with the gas purchaser. The operator
alleged that it was not obligated to make take-or-pay claims on behalf of the non-
operators because under Texas law and the joint operating agreement, the parties
were not joint venturers. Therefore, the operator had no fiduciary duty to make such
claims.
The operator argued that article V.A, "Description and Responsibilities of
Operator," of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement, limited its obligations and
affirmative duties to the express terms of the agreement which did not impose an
express, affirmative obligation to make the take-or-pay claims."'
The court rejected the operator's argument, stating that article VII.A, "Liability of
Parties," of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement provides, "It is not the
intention of the parties to create, nor shall this agreement be construed as creating,
a mining or other partnership or association, or to render the parties liable as
partners.".. The court determined that the parties intended in the joint operating
agreement to delegate operational and managerial control to the operator while
shielding the non-operators from liability."' The court recognized that in prior
Texas cases, the courts gave this desired effect to the Model Form Operating
Agreement when the rights of third parties were involved." '
108. ld
109. Id; see also Taylor v. GWR Operating Co., 820 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App. - Houston 1991, writ
denied). In Taylor, the court agreed with the Texstar decision that parties to a joint operating agreement
do not generally owe each other the duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing. Taylor, 820 S.W.2d at
912. Also, based on the analysis in Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App. -
El Paso 1982, writ refd n.r.e.), the court determined that the parties did not create a joint venture under
the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement because the operator had full control of all operations and
the joint operating agreement provided for several, not joint, liability. Id.; see also Smith v. L.D. Bums
Drilling Co., 852 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. App. - Waco 1993, no writ); Anderson v. Vinson Exploration, Inc.,
832 S.W.2d 657, 667(Tex. App. - El Paso 1992, writ denied) (holding that a joint operating agreement
does not establish a joint venture as a matter of law).
110. 837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App. - Austin 1992, writ denied). Johnston clarified to a great extent
the analysis of the relationship of the operator and non-operator under the Model Form Operating
Agreement as set out in the cases cited above.
111. The operator relied upon a series of cases, including Youngstown, in which the operator's third-
party creditors sought to hold non-operators liable based on partnership, agency, and joint venture
principles. Id. at 715. The court rejected the operator's reliance on this authority, stating that these cases
addressed the relationship between the operator and third parties, and were not dispositive of the issues
raised by the non-operators. Id.
112. Id. at 716.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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In this case, the court determined that under the joint operating agreement, the
operator had the authority to bind the non-operators to a contract for the sale of their
gas."' The court held that although the Model Form Operating Agreement did not
create a joint venture, thereby imposing afiduciary duty, this did not mean that the
operator owed no duty whatsoever to the non-operators under the Model Form
Operating Agreement" '6 In fact, the court found that the non-operators' cause of
action did not depend upon a finding that the operator owed a fiduciary duty to the
non-operators under the agreement."7 Rather, under article V.A of the joint
operating agreement, the operator had a duty to perform "in a good and workmanlike
manner.""' Thus, the operator owed a duty to the non-operators under the Model
Form Operating Agreement to perform as a reasonably prudent operator."'
2. Oklahoma
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Sparks Bros. Drilling Co. v. Texas Moran
Exploration Co., followed, in part, the concepts set forth in the Texas cases
discussed above. In Sparks Bros., the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered whether
a joint operating agreement similar to the 1956 or 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model
Form Operating Agreement created a mining partnership. In framing its discussion,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated the dispositive issue was whether the non-
operator was a mining partner of the operator of the well.' If a mining partnership
existed, then the non-operator was jointly and severally liable for the costs incurred
in operations under the operating agreement." However, if a mining partnership
did not exist, then the non-operator was severally liable only to the extent of its
interest in the subject well."
Reviewing the provisions of the joint operating agreement, the court explained that
the agreement gave each party the right to take and dispose of its share of the oil and
gas. The agreement specifically provided that the parties were severally, not
jointly or collectively, liable and that the agreement should not be construed as
creating a mining partnership."u The court also noted that the operating agreement
held each party responsible only for its share of the costs of developing and operating
the subject well.'"
Further, the court found that the operating agreement specifically provided that the
relationship of the parties should be treated as a partnership for tax purposes only."
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. l&
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 829 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1991).
121. Id. at 952.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. L
125. Id.
126. Id
127. d.
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With respect to the subject well, the agreement provided that the operator had full
and direct control of all operations." However, the agreement contained a
provision permitting the override of this control by a vote of the parties chargeable
with the costs of the operation in proportion to their obligations for those costs."
The parties, however, never exercised this voting control.'
Turning to the issue of whether the joint operating agreement created a mining
partnership, the court stated that in order for a mining partnership to be created in
Oklahoma, three elements must exist:'3' (I) a joint interest in the property; (2)
either an express or implied agreement to share in the profits and losses of the
operations, and (3) cooperation by the parties in the project.' In this case, the
court specifically found that the third prong of the test had not been met; namely, the
parties did not cooperate in the project.
The court explained that, in a prior decision, it had defined cooperation in a project
as .'actively joining in the promotion, conduct or management' of a project.""5 A
joint operating agreement by itself does not create a mining partnership.' The
court stated, however, that a mining partnership can arise from the behavior of the
parties."'
In this case, the acts of the non-operator were insufficient to prove cooperation in
the drilling of the well in question. 37 Although the non-operator received reports,
questioned billings, hired a pumper to evaluate the well in contemplation of assuming
operations of the well, and completed other similar tasks, the court concluded that
any prudent investor would act similarly to protect his investment. 3' These acts,
then, did not create a mining partnership between the parties. 3 "
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id.
131. Id at 953.
132. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Pappas, 383 P.2d 645, 647 (Okla. 1963)).
133. id.
134. Id. (quoting Jenkins, 383 P.2d at 647).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id at 954.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also Crosby-Miss. Res., Ltd. v. Saga Petroleum U.S., Inc., 767 F.2d 143 (5th Cir.
1985). Applying Mississippi law, the court held the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement did not
create ajoint venture. Id. at 147. The court stated that in order for there to be a joint venture, there must
be (1) a joint proprietary interest, (2) the right of mutual control, and (3) an agreement, express or
implied, to share in the profits of the venture. Id. The court found that the tenor of the 1956 Model Form
Operating Agreement, as well as the explicit contractual language and the undisputed facts in the case,
indicated that the parties did not intend to share profits from the marketing of refined petroleum products,
the alleged joint venture. Id. Even if the parties did establish a joint venture, the court commented that
the duties pertaining to such joint venture would not extend beyond a reasonable interpretation of the
Model Form Operating Agreement, which did not include the marketing of refined petroleum products.
Id.; see also Caddo Oil Co., Inc. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13, 17 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the subject
joint operating agreement, which apparently was not a Model Form Operating Agreement, did not create
a fiduciary relationship between the operator and the non-operator, but rather imposed on the operator
the duty to act as a prudent operator); Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corp., 220 So. 2d 783, 787 (La. Ct.
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IlI. The Enforceability of Exculpatory Language
In cases that define the relationship between the operator and the non-operator by
examining the express provisions of the Model Form Operating Agreement, there
remains the question of the enforceability of the exculpatory language in the Model
Form Operating Agreement, which further limits the liability of the operator. Section
5, "Operator of Unit," of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement contains
exculpatory language providing that the operator has no liability to the other parties
to the agreement for losses sustained, or liabilities incurred, except as may result
from the operator's gross negligence or from the operator's breach of the provisions
of the agreement. Article V.A, "Designation and Responsibilities of Operator," of the
1977, 1982, and 1989 Model Form Operating Agreements provides that the operator
shall have no liability to the other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred,
except as may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct.
In Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., a non-operator sued the operator under a 1977
AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement. The non-operator alleged that
the operator breached certain provisions of the joint operating agreement by failing
to deliver to the non-operator operations of two wells covered by the agreement prior
to the operator plugging and abandoning the wells. The non-operator asserted that
the plugging and abandoning of the wells damaged the wellbores, causing the non-
operators to drill replacement wells in order to test the shallower formations
encountered in the plugged and abandoned wells. Furthermore, the non-operator
asserted that the operator refused to share certain information as required by the joint
operating agreement.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit focused its analysis on article
V, "Operator," of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement."' Article V.A,
"Designation and Responsibilities of Operator," provided that the operator "shall
conduct all such operations in a good and workman like manner, but it shall have no
liability as Operator to the other parties . . . except as may result from gross
negligence or willful misconduct." 2 The court determined this clause was
sufficiently clear and unambiguous.'"3 The court explained that the provision used
the word "liability," a very broad legal term whose meaning includes "legal respon-
sibility" and "responsibility for torts."'" The court determined that this provision
sufficiently stated the parties' intent.
4
In its decision, the court relied upon an article in the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute commenting on article V of the Model Form Operating Agreement
App. 1969) (holding that the express provisions of the joint operating agreement, which was not a Model
Form Operating Agreement, did not create ajoint venture or a fiduciary relationship among the parties).
140. 976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992).
141. /d. at 259.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 260.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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Such clauses do not, of course, purport to authorize the operator to act
in a negligent manner. They do however, purport to exculpate the
operator from liability for negligent injury to the joint property and
partially indemnify him against liability for negligence injury to third
parties. Under Art. V., the operator would not be liable to the
nonoperators if his negligent drilling resulted in the well blowing out.'"
The court concluded that the tenor of the exculpatory provision suggested that the
operator was not liable for good-faith performance of its duties under the 1977 Model
Form Operating Agreement, but was liable for acts outside the scope of its power
under the agreement.'47 In this case, the operator could not be held liable for any
action relating to the completion, testing, or turnover of any well drilled under the
provisions of the joint operating agreement unless the non-operator could prove that
the operator acted willfully or with gross negligence.'" The court found that this
protection extended to the operator's various administrative and accounting duties,
including the recovery of costs pursuant to the parties' joint operating agreement."'
Additionally, the court determined that the protection of the exculpatory clause
extended not only to the acts unique to the operator, but also to any acts performed
under the authority of the joint operating agreement as operator.'- This protection
would include breaches of the joint operating agreement as well as acts performed
as operator pursuant to the operating agreement that amounted to tortious interference
with contracts with third parties.'
The court concluded that the exculpatory clause in the 1977 Model Form
Operating Agreement shielded the operator from liability for any act taken in its
capacity as operator if authorized by the agreement, except for gross negligence or
willful misconduct." z Consequently, the court reversed and remanded the case for
a new trial with the jury to determine, based on the court's interpretation of the
exculpatory clause, whether the operator's actions constituted willful misconduct or
gross negligence."'
146. Id.
147. Id. at 261.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 267; see also Archer v. Grynberg, 738 F. Supp. 449 (Utah 1990). In Archer, the court
held that the operator was not liable pursuant to article V.A, "Designation and Responsibilities of
Pperator," of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement except for gross negligence or willful
misconduct. Archer, 738 F. Supp. at 451. The court determined that its construction of article V.A
comported with the understanding in the oil and gas industry that it is prudent to limit the liability of an
operator to non-operators under a joint operating agreement. Id. at 452; see also Lancaster v. Petroleum
Corp., 491 So. 2d 768,773-74 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that an operator, found by the trial court not
to be negligent in causing a well blowout, could not be liable under the exculpatory language of section
5, "Operator of Unit," of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement because there could be no finding
that the operator was grossly negligent).
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IV. Loss of Title
Each version of the Model Form Operating Agreement provides that the parties
shall own the interests in the equipment and materials acquired in connection with
operations conducted under the joint operating agreement, and in all production of
oil and gas from the lands covered by the agreement, as set forth in Exhibit A
attached to the agreement.TM The various versions of the Model Form Operating
Agreement also address the situation in which an oil and gas lease or interest,
covered by the agreement and used in calculating the interests as shown on Exhibit
A to the agreement, is lost, and how such loss will affect the interests shown on
Exhibit A."'
A. Failure of Title
In Dooley v. Cordes,'56 the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted section 2.B,
"Failure of Title," of the 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement.
Dooley involved parties who had entered into a joint operating agreement covering
the oil and gas lease of the plaintiff, which lease had been acquired from the owner
of a term mineral interest. Exhibit A to the joint operating agreement showed the
plaintiff owning 3.125% of the working interest in the unit area. The term mineral
interest subject to the plaintiffs oil and gas lease terminated, resulting in the
termination of the plaintiffs lease. The plaintiff asserted that because of a special
provision added to section 30 of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement,
plaintiff maintained its 3.125% working interest in the unit area regardless of the fact
that its oil and gas lease covering such interest had terminated.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated the only issue on appeal was whether the
operator, by entering into the Model Form Operating Agreement, was obligated to
regard plaintiff as owning 3.125% of the working interest in the applicable unit even
though the plaintiffs lease had terminated.'" The court focused its analysis on the
provisions of the joint operating agreement.
The failure of title provision contained in section 2.B of the agreement states that
the interest of a party whose lease is affected by a failure of title will thereafter be
154. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. III.B ("Interests of Parties in Costs and Production");
1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. III.B; 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. III.B; 1956 Model
Form, supra note 9, § 4; see also Fuel Exploration, Inc. v. Novotny, 374 N.W.2d 838 (Neb. 1985). In
Fuel Exploration, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined ownership of equipment acquired ly the
operator under the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement, but erroneously placed
upon land not covered by the operating agreement, The court ruled that, as a matter of law, the operator
and non-operators under the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement, specifically article 1ll.B, "Interests
of Parties in Costs and Production," and article VII.B, "Liens and Payment Defaults," owned the
equipment in question and were entitled to possession. Fuel Exploration, 374 N.W.2d at 841-43.
155. 1989 Model Form, supra, note 9, at art. IV.B ("Loss of Leases For Other Than Title Failure");
1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. IV.B (same); 1977 Model Form, supra, note 9, at art. IV.B
(same); 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, §§ 2.B, 2.C.
156. 434 P.2d 289 (Okla. 1967).
157. Id. at 292.
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reduced in the unit area by the amount of the interest lost." The plaintiff claimed
that a special provision added to section 30 of the Model Form Operating Agreement
modified the failure of title provision.'" This special provision stated that if the
plaintiff did not desire to advance his proportionate share of the costs of the test well
as provided for in section 7, "Test Well," of the agreement, the operator could
advance such costs.'" Upon advancing such costs, the operator would be entitled
to withhold and sell the production from the test well attributable to the interest of
the plaintiff until 200% of such costs had been recovered by the operator. 6' The
plaintiff asserted that this special provision was added for the purpose of ensuring his
entitlement to 3.125% of the working interest share of the production from the
applicable unit, irrespective of any failure of title.'
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument, finding that he was subject to the
failure of title provision.'" In evaluating the plaintiffs argument, the court stated:
In our opinion, this argument is not convincing and fails to show
why - if Dooley had been intended to be excepted from the operation
of the provisions of the Agreement's section 2B(2) - the simple
expression "except David L. Dooley" would not have clearly and
practically implemented such an intention.'"
The court concluded that there was no conflict between the failure of title
provision and the special provision in section 30, and that no ostensible uncertainty
was created by these two provisions." The court found no reason or justification
to look elsewhere because the written agreement itself resolved the controversy.'"
Finally, the court recognized that the recorded oil and gas leases covering the lands
within the unit area set forth in the Model Form Operating Agreement normally
comprise the basis for the fractional tabulations or computations set forth on Exhibit
A to the agreement.6
B. Loss of Title for Other than Failure of Title
In Huggs, Inc. v. LPC Energy, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
interpreted and applied section 2.C, "Loss of Leases For Other Than Title Failure,"
of the 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement in connection with
the loss of oil and gas leases covered by the operating agreement. Some of the leases
at issue were lost due to the failure to pay delay rentals. Others were lost because
158. Id.
159. Id. at 293.
160. Id
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 293-94.
165. Id at 295.
166. Id
167. Id
168. 889 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1989).
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the operator failed to commence drilling or reworking operations within the specified
time period after the cessation of production from the well on the applicable lease.
The court found that under section 2.C of the joint operating agreement, if a lease
is permitted to expire, the loss is not a failure of title, but is a joint loss which does
not affect the allocation of interests between the parties.'6
C. Changes in Interest Due to Changes in Drilling and Spacing Units
In addition to a change in a party's interest within the contract area resulting from
the loss of an oil and gas lease, a party's interest in a well drilled under a Model
Form Operating Agreement may also change because of an alteration in the drilling
and spacing unit in which the well covered by the operating agreement is located.
Kaiser Aluminum Exploration Co. v. Celeron Oil & Gas Co.,"7 a Louisiana Court
of Appeal decision, addressed this situation.
In Kaiser, the Commissioner of Conservation had issued an order establishing a
640-acre geographic unit designated as the Sand Unit H, with the Baxter No. 1 well
as the unit well. Such unit was operated under a 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form
Operating Agreement. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Conservation issued an
order dissolving the geographic unit and creating a geological unit. In the original
geographic unit, the non-operator's participation in the Baxter No. 1 well was
calculated in the agreement at 33.5657%. However, because of the creation of the
geological unit, which excluded a considerable portion of the non-operator's leasehold
acreage, the non-operator's participation lessened considerably.
The non-operator filed a declaratory action seeking a judicial determination that
its interest in the original geographic unit was fixed at 33.56575% and that it was
entitled to 33.5657% of the production attributable to that portion of the prior
geographical unit now lying within the new geological unit. The non-operator argued
that section 4, "Interests of Parties," of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement,
and Exhibit A attached thereto, set forth the unit description and the participation by
the leasehold owners. The non-operator further claimed that these provisions
exhibited the parties' clear intent to fix for all time the non-operator's participation
in the unit acreage and production attributable thereto.
The operator refuted the non-operator's analysis based, in part, upon section 28,
"Claims and Lawsuits," of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement, which
provided that legal fees in defending lawsuits "shall be considered costs of operation
and shall be charged to and paid by all parties in proportion to their then interest in
the Unit Area.'.' The operator also relied upon section 25, "Acreage or Cash
Contributions," of the joint operating agreement which provided that any party who
makes an acreage contribution in lieu of a cash contribution shall make an
assignment "to all parties to this agreement in proportion to their interests in the unit
169. Id. at 655.
170. 526 So. 2d 374 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
171. Id.
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area at that time."'" The operator asserted that these provisions evidenced the
parties' intention not to permanently fix their respective interests in the unit.
In analyzing the parties' respective arguments and reviewing the 1956 Model Form
Operating Agreement, the court stated that the only conclusion it could reach was
that the agreement failed to specifically state whether the parties' interests were fixed
for all time." The court determined that the joint operating agreement was
ambiguous and susceptible to different interpretations concerning the fixing of the
parties' interests." Thus, the appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the non-operator and remanded the case for a trial on
the merits."5
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration,
Inc."6 reached a different conclusion than the Louisiana Court of Appeal in Kaiser
Aluminum regarding the effect, under the Model Form Operating Agreement, of a
change in a drilling and spacing unit created by the applicable conservation body
exercising the police power of the state. In Pasternak, the parties had entered into
a 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement covering Section 23.
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission had established a 640-acre drilling and
spacing unit in Section 23 for the applicable formation. Under the Model Form
Operating Agreement, the parties agreed to participate, according to an agreed ratio
of interests and for a specified period of time, in all oil and gas produced from
Section 23.
The operator drilled and completed a producing well in the SW'A of Section 23.
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission subsequently respaced Section 23 for the
relevant formation from one 640-acre drilling and spacing unit to eight 80-acre
drilling and spacing units. The plaintiff subsequently acquired oil and gas leases
covering the NE of Section 23 through a farmout agreement from one of the non-
operators to the joint operating agreement. The parties made the farmout agreement
specifically subject to the joint operating agreement The plaintiff drilled two wells
on the acreage acquired. Various other parties to the joint operating agreement
claimed interests under such agreement in the wells drilled by the plaintiff.
On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that upon the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's
reformation of the 640-acre drilling and spacing unit to eight 80-acre drilling and
spacing units, the scope of the joint operating agreement became limited to the 80-
acre drilling and spacing unit on which the initial well, drilled under the agreement,
was located. The plaintiff asserted that after the respacing, the joint operating
agreement did not cover any of the parties' interests in the NEA of Section 23 where
the plaintiff had drilled its wells.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 377.
175. Id. at 378.
176. 790 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 54:211
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss2/2
THE MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs contention,'"
explaining that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has the statutorily prescribed
duty to prohibit and control waste and to protect correlative rights. 7" The court also
explained, however, that the jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission is limited
to its statutorily prescribed duties.'" The rights to produce a designated quantity of
hydrocarbons from a well, and owner-operator interests and obligations, are the
proper subjects of a private agreement, provided that the private agreement does not
cause or grant a license to commit waste or diminish correlative rights."m
The court concluded that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the joint operating
agreement encouraged waste or allowed a party to take more than its share from the
common source of supply in derogation of correlative rights."' Also, the plaintiff
showed no indication that the division of rights and obligations as set out in the
Model Form Operating Agreement undermined the public interest served by
respacing the 640-acre drilling and spacing unit." Therefore, the court held that
the respacing order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission could not limit the
scope of the joint operating agreement." Thus, the district court did not err in
determining that the parties to the joint operating agreement did, in fact, own by
virtue of such agreement an interest in the wells drilled by the plaintiff."
V. Resignation or Removal of Operator
Each version of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement provides
a space for the parties to specifically designate which party will be "Operator" under
the agreement. These forms further address the manner in which and the
conditions under which the designated operator may resign or be removed."
In Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp. of Delaware,'" the Louisiana Court of Appeal
considered whether the operator breached the provisions of the 1956 AAPL Form
610 Model Form Operating Agreement by failing to give ninety days notice of its
resignation as operator, and by threatening to plug and abandon the subject well
without the consent of the non-operators. The operator in Lancaster argued that the
ninety-day notice requirement, as provided for in paragraph I of section 21,
177. Id at 835-36.
178. Id. at 835.
179. Id. at 836.
180. Id.
181. Id
182. Id.
183. ld
184. Id.
185. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. V.A ("Designation and Responsibilities of Operator");
1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. V.A (same); 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. V.A (same);
1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 5 ("Operator of Unit").
186. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at arts. V.B.1, V.B.3 ("Resignation or Removal of Operator"
and "Effect of Bankruptcy" respectively); 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, art. V.B.l ("Resignation or
Removal of Operator"); 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, art. V.B.I (same); 1956 Model Form, supra
note 9, §§ 19, 21 ("Selection of New Operator" and "Resignation of Operator" respectively).
187. 491 So. 2d 768 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
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"Resignation of Operator," of the joint operating agreement was not necessary
because of section 12, "Operations By Less Than All Parties," and paragraph 2 of
section 21, "Resignation of Operator," of the agreement.'"
The court rejected the operator's contention, finding that neither section 12 nor
paragraph 2 of section 21 relieved the operator of the obligation of giving ninety days
notice as required by paragraph I of section 21 of the joint operating agreement."m
Thus, the court concluded that the operator's resignation without ninety days advance
written notice to the non-operators constituted a breach of the 1956 Model Form
Operating Agreement."
Additionally, the court found it abundantly clear that the operator did not have the
requisite consent of the non-operators when the operator threatened to plug and
abandon the subject well."' The court held that the operator's threat to plug and
abandon the subject well was unreasonable and also held that the threat constituted
a breach of the operating agreement."
VI. The Selection of Successor Operator
In addition to the provisions in the various versions of the AAPL Form 610 Model
Form Operating Agreements providing for the designation of an operator and the
resignation and removal of an operator, these agreements also contain provisions
addressing the selection of a successor operator.""
A. Right to Change Vote for Successor Operator
In Oxley v. General Atlantic Resources, Inc., 4 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
considered whether section 19, "Selection of New Operator," of the 1956 AAPL
Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement, permitted a non-operator to change its
vote for a successor operator within sixty days after notification of the sale of the
current operator's interest in the contract area.
In Oxley, BHP, the original operator under the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement, sold its interest in the contract area to the defendant and notified all
parties of its resignation as unit operator. The defendant subsequently gave notice to
the non-operators that the defendant would assume the duties of operator as BHP's
"representative," and then requested that the non-operators appoint a successor
operator.
The plaintiff, one of the non-operators, asked the other non-operators to appoint
it as the successor operator under the joint operating agreement. Eberly, another non-
188. Id. at 776.
189. Id. at 777.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. V.B.2 ("Selection of Successor Operator"); 1982 Model
Form, supra note 9, at art. V.B.2 (same); 1977 Model Form. supra note 9, at art. V.B.2 (same); 1956
Model Form, supra note 9, § 19 ("Selection of New Operator").
194. 1997 OK 46, 936 P.2d 943.
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operator, voted initially for the defendant as operator, but then changed its vote in
favor of the plaintiff within the sixty-day period provided for in section 19 of the
joint operating agreement. With Eberly's vote the defendant would have been elected
successor operator; however, after Eberly changed its vote, the plaintiff accumulated
enough votes to be elected successor operator. The plaintiff sought a judgment
declaring it the duly elected successor operator.
In its analysis, the Oklahoma Supreme Court framed the issue on appeal as
whether section 19, "Selection of New Operator," of the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement permitted an owner to change its vote for a successor operator within
sixty days after notification of the sale of the current owner's interest.' The court
determined that the joint operating agreement did not expressly address whether a
party could change its vote for a successor operator, which created an ambiguity.'
The court pointed out that the parties had cited no authority construing section 19 of
the joint operating agreement.' The court viewed the joint operating agreement as
a contract, and explained that the agreement must be construed to conform to the
intentions of the parties.'"
The court stated that a construction or interpretation of section 19 of the Model
Form Operating Agreement that permitted a change in a vote for a successor operator
during the sixty-day period would not promote instability or uncertainty as to the
operations under the agreement.'" The court found that, pursuant to section 19, the
original operator was to operate the well for not more than 120 days or until the non-
operators selected a successor operator who could take over the duties of an
operator.' Thus, the operation of the wells could run smoothly, even though the
successor was not determined until sixty days after the parties were notified of a
sale.m The court found that the defendant had taken over operations under the joint
operating agreement only because of the purchase agreement with BHP requiring it
to assume BHP's duties under the joint operating agreement.'
Furthermore, the court relied on custom and usage in the oil and gas industry as
an important guide to resolving the ambiguity in the Model Form Operating
Agreement and determining the intent of the parties to such agreement., Conse-
quently, the court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions that if the
evidence showed that, based on custom and usage in the oil and gas industry, vote
195. d. 3, 936 P.2d at 944.
196. Id. '112, 936 P.2d at 945.
197. Id. 13, 936 P.2d at 945.
198. lit
199. IL 115, 936 P.2d at 946.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. 1 17, 936 P.2d at 946. The court noted that the Model Form Operating Agrement
incorporates industry custom and usage. Id. 19, 936 P.2d at 946 (citing Heiman v. Adt. Richfield Co.,
891 P.2d 1252, 1251 (Okla. 1995)).
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changes during the sixty-day period were not permitted, then the trial court should
construe the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement accordingly.'
B. Selection of Successor Operator by Estoppel
Even with a specific provision setting forth the procedure for selection of a
subsequent operator, parties to the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating
Agreement may occasionally select a successor operator without complying with the
specific provisions of the agreement. An Oklahbma court addressed such a situation
in Oklahoma Oil & Gas Exploration Drilling Program 1983-A v. W.M.A. Corp.'
In April 1987, WMA acquired the working interests in twenty-eight wells from the
designated operator under 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreements.
WMA then assumed operations of the wells without first obtaining new operating
agreements designating WMA as operator or complying with the subsequent
operator's election provisions under the applicable joint operating agreements. WMA
operated the wells for several months, issuing joint interest billings to the non-
operators.
The non-operators filed suit seeking to remove WMA as operator and to obtain an
accounting of certain costs incurred by WMA and billed to them. The trial court
found that the non-operators consented to WMA's operation of the wells and were
therefore estopped from denying WMA's status as operator.2
On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated the issue to be resolved as
whether WMA was the operator pursuant to the applicable joint operating
agreements.' The court found that the Model Form Operating Agreements
provided specific procedures for the resignation of operators and the election of
subsequent operators.' In this case, no formal selection process existed prior to
WMA's assumption of operations.' However, WMA had assumed operations and
operated the wells without protest through much of 1987!0
The court explained that, under certain circumstances, words or conduct of a party
may operate to estop him from demanding strict compliance with contract terms.21
If a party leads one to believe that he will not insist upon literal performance of a
contract term and the other party detrimentally relies thereon, the first party will be
estopped from demanding literal compliance."'
204. Id.
205. 877 P.2d 605 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
206. The trial court found that the non-operators knew for several months that WMA was acting
as operator. Also, the non-operators paid joint interest billings, which included operating costs on the
wells, while WMA was acting as operator. Id. at 608.
207. d. at 609.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. lid
212. Id.
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The court based its decision on the fact that the non-operators knew of WMA's
operation of the wells in April 1987.!'3 Additionally, the non-operators paid
portions of the joint interest billings submitted by WMA, which referred to WMA
as operator of the subject wells.2 ' Yet, the non-operators failed to object to WMA's
operation until late in 1987.! The court found that WMA relied on the non-
operators' payment of the joint interest billings and the non-operators' failure to object
to WMA's operation of the wells.! WMA operated the wells, incurring costs for
the benefit of all working interest owners.217 Based on these undisputed facts, the
court concluded that the non-operators were estopped to deny WMA's status as
operator of the wells!"
VII. The Obligations of Operator in Connection with Test or Initial Well
Each version of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement provides
for the drilling of a test or initial well within the lands covered by the operating
agreement. The agreements provide for the commencement date, the location, and
the total depth or target formation for such well." 9 All versions of the Model Form
Operating Agreement obligate the operator to drill the test or initial well to the
designated depth or target formation unless the well encounters granite or other
practically impenetrable substance, or encounters a condition in the hole which
renders further operations impractical.'
In Lerblance v. Continental Oil Co., ' the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Oklahoma interpreted a provision of a joint operating agreement
that appears to be section 7, "Test Well," of the 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form
Operating Agreement. Pursuant to this provision, the operator had an obligation to
drill the test well to a "depth sufficient to test the Spiro formation, expected at a
depth of approximately 13,000 feet, unless granite or other practically impenetrable
substance is encountered at a lesser depth or unless all parties agree to complete the
well at a lesser depth."'
The operator drilled the well to a depth of approximately 7600 feet but determined
that because of problems encountered in the wellbore, the wellbore should be plugged
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id
217. Id.
218. Id
219. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at arts. V[.A, VI.F ("Initial Well" and "Termination of
Operations" respectively); 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.A ("Initial Well"); 1977 Model
Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.A (same); 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 7 ("Test Well").
220. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.F.; 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.F.;
1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.F. The 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement, however,
does not expressly relieve the operator of the obligation to drill the test well if conditions are encountered
in the hole which render further drilling or other operations impractical.
221. 437 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
222. Ud. at 224.
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and abandoned because further remedial operations or further attempted drilling was
not prudent. Without the consent of the non-operators, the operator plugged and
abandoned the well. The non-operators sued the operator for breach of section 7 of
the joint operating agreement.
The court determined that the operator had encountered a "practically impenetrable
substance" within the meaning of section 7 of the joint operating agreement, as
evidenced by the inordinate difficulties encountered by the operator in drilling the
well.'m The court found that the circumstances relieved the operator of its
obligation to continue further operations in the test well under such section.'m The
court further found that the agreement did not require the operator to obtain the
consent of the non-operators before plugging and abandoning the subject well.'m
The last sentence of section 7 provided that if the operator desires to "plug and
abandon the test [well] as a dry hole," then the operator must first secure the consent
of all parties to the plugging.'m The court defined a dry hole as "a completed well
which is not productive of oil and/or gas (or which is not productive of oil and/or gas
in paying quantities)."' 7 Thus, a well must have been completed to qualify as a dry
hole.'m
Because the subject well had never been completed or tested the target formation,
the well was not a dry hole and was not covered by the last sentence of section 7 of
the joint operating agreement' m Consequently, the operator did not have an
obligation to give notice to, or obtain consent from, the non-operators prior to
plugging and abandoning the test well.'
VIII. Subsequent Operations
Each version of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement includes
provisions prescribing the manner in which a well or operation subsequent to the
initial or test well may be drilled or conducted under the joint operating
agreement."' Each of the Model Form Operating Agreements sets forth a procedure
223. Id. at 228. The court considered the difficulties the operator encountered and determined the
operator had come across a "practically impenetrable substance." d. These difficulties included the
following: the formations' tendency to cave in; the steep dip of the beds being penetrated which made
it difficult for the drill bit to maintain vertical penetration; abrupt and severe deviation; 1200 feet of iron
that the operator lost in the hole; the more than $600,000 expended to obtain a depth of approximately
7600 feet; and the fact that the total cost of the well would have been in excess of $1.2 million with the
cost of sidetracldng or drilling a window in the casing and drilling the well to the projected depth, if such
activities were mechanically possible. Id.
224. Id. at 229.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. The 1977, 1982, and 1989 Model Form Operating Agreements expressly expand conditions
in the test well that will relieve the operator of its obligation to continue operations. These expansions
include encountering conditions in the wellbore that render further drilling or other operations
impractical.
231. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B ("Subsequent Operations"); 1982 Model Form,
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for the parties to commit to participate or not to participate in the proposed
subsequent well or other operation.z These provisions further provide for certain
"penalties" to be applied to the interests relinquished by the parties who elect not to
participate or to go "non-consent" in the proposed subsequent well or other
operation."m
A. Sidetrack Operation in Initial Well Not Subsequent Operation
In Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey," the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
was asked to interpret article VI.B, "Subsequent Operations," of the 1977 AAPL
Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement to determine whether a sidetrack
operation in the initial well constituted either a continuation of such initial well or a
subsequent operation under the agreement. In Holt, the operator was to drill the
initial well under the joint operating agreement to a true vertical depth of 6900 feet,
or to a depth sufficient to test the Marmaton formation. After drilling the initial well
to a depth of 6700 feet and encountering numerous problems in the well, the operator
proposed to sidetrack the well in order to drill to a depth sufficient to evaluate the
Marmaton formation.
After receiving the proposal, the non-operator informed the operator that he would
not pay any expenses in connection with the sidetrack operation. The operator
continued unsuccessfully with the sidetrack operation. The operator sued the non-
operator for the non-operator's proportionate share of the well costs incurred in
connection with the sidetrack operation.
The non-operator claimed that the sidetrack operation was a subsequent operation
under article VI.B of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement. Therefore, he was
not liable for the costs incurred in such operation absent his prior approval. The trial
court refused to find that, as a matter of law, the subsequent operations provision in
article VI.B of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement covered the sidetrack
operation in the initial well.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that "the interpretation
of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law to be decided by the court." " The
determination of whether a particular contract is ambiguous is also a question of
law. In analyzing the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement, the court
concluded that the contract did not clarify whether the sidetrack operation constituted
a subsequent operation or an initial operation with respect to the initial well.m
supra note 9, at art. VI.B (same); 1977 Model Form. supra note 9, at art. VJ.B (sane); 1956 Model
Form, supra note 9, § 12 ("Operations By Less Than All Parties").
232. Id
233. Itd
234. 801 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1986).
235. Id at 780.
236. Id
237. id at 780-81. In discussing the subsequent operations provision, the court stated:
The JOA defines subsequent operations to include "any well on the Contract Area other
than [the initial well]" or any operation intended to "rework, deepen or plug back a dry
hole [or a well] not then producing in paying quantities ... ." The provision defining
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The court also discussed whether or not the provisions of article VII.D,
"Limitations on Expenditures," of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement
applied to the sidetrack operation." This provision limited the amount the operator
could spend on any single project, but excepted expenditures made in connection
with a previously authorized well. 9 Again, the court determined that the ap-
plication of article VII.D to the sidetrack operation in the initial well presented the
same ambiguity as article VI.B.2 ° The court determined that if the sidetrack
operation was a continuation of the initial well, then the spending limit in article
VII.D might be inapplicable because such article expressly excepted from its
coverage the drilling of a previously authorized well. '
The court noted that the provisions of article VII.D appeared to emphasize
expenses incurred during the course of subsequent operations. 2 If the sidetrack
operation was a second well or a subsequent operation, then article VII.D would
apply.43 The court found sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's
decision that the sidetrack operation was not a subsequent or other operation under
the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement.2"
B. Sidetrack Operation Constitutes Subsequent Operation - Not Plugging and
Abandonment of Well
In Jackhill Oil Co. v. Powell Production, Inc., S the Michigan Court of Appeals
resolved a conflict between the parties' interpretations of article VI.B, "Subsequent
Operations," and article VI.E.2, "Abandonment of Wells That Have Produced," in the
1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement. Jackhill Oil involved an
operator who proposed the redrilling of the initial well to a different bottomhole
location because the well had become unprofitable. The operator believed that article
VI.B of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement covered this operation. One of
the non-operators did not agree to participate in the redrilling operation, claiming that
subsequent operations does not mention sidetrack operations. A sidetrack could be
considered a well "other than the initial well." On the other hand, the provision for an
initial well indicates an intent to drill as necessary to test the Marmaton formation. The
Campbell I operation resulted in an incomplete test of the Marmaton formation because
the hole was lost. The sidetrack operation could be considered merely a continuation of
the initial test effort.
Id. (alterations in original).
238. Id. at 781.
239. IL
240. Id.
241. d.
242. lit
243. Id.
244. Id. Interestingly, article VI.B of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement does not
specifically mention a sidetrack operation. However, article VI.B of each of the 1982 and 1989 Model
Form Operating Agreements does specifically address sidetrack operations. These subsequent Model
Form Operating Agreements removed the uncertainty that existed in article VI.B of the 1977 Model Form
Operating Agreement.
245. 532 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
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the operation constituted the plugging and abandonment of the initial well, governed
by article VI.E.2 of the operating agreement.
Under article VI.E.2 of the agreement, if a well were proposed to be abandoned,
then any party not in agreement with the proposal had the right to take over the well
and purchase the other parties' interests in the well. In such event, the other parties
agreeing to the plugging proposal would assign all of their interests in the well,
related equipment, and the leasehold estate to the party objecting to the plugging
proposal.
In this case, the non-operator refusing to participate in the proposed redrilling
operation tendered the monies required under article VI.E.2. However, the other
parties refused this tender, claiming that article VI.B covered the proposed operation.
The operator conducted the redrilling operation, but the operation proved to be
unsuccessful.
The non-operator who refused to participate in the redrilling operation filed suit,
claiming that the other parties had confiscated its interest in the initial well and that
it had the right to acquire all interests in such well under the provisions of article
VI.E.2. The trial court ruled in the favor of the defendants.
On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals relied upon the reasoning set forth in
an unpublished opinion from the court and stated:
In Krol, the defendant had engaged in a "sidetrack" operation, which
involved creating an opening in the casing of the old well and drilling
through to a new bottom hole. There, the Court concluded that a well
must be both plugged and abandoned before operating agreement
language pertaining to the salvage of an abandoned well becomes
applicable.
The court believed that, in this case, the operator had embarked upon a sidetrack
operation similar to that performed in KroI.u 7 Both parties plugged the original
bottomhole, but used a significant portion of the upper weilbore, which they had
preserved, to drill to the new location.'
The court determined that because the operator and the non-operators who
consented to drilling to the new bottomhole location did not intend to plug and
abandon the well, and because the well was, in actuality, plugged but not abandoned,
246. Id. at 868 (citing Krol v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 132336 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1992) (per
curiam)). The court further reasoned:
In Krol, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had "plugged and abandoned" an oil
well, entitling them to an assignment of the defendant's interest in the well under their
contract. The language in the KroI agreement was similar to that found in § VI.E.2 of the
operating agreement here. The defendant in Krol countered that, although it had plugged
a portion of the well, the record showed undisputed efforts to preserve the well, not
abandon it.
Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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article VI.E.2 of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement did not applyu 9
Rather, article VI.B covered the operation.' Therefore, the objecting non-operator
was not entitled to the other parties' interests in the subject well, the related
equipment, or the leasehold under article VI.E.2 of the agreement."M
C. Proper Notice of Subsequent Operation
The subsequent operations provision in each version of the AAPL Form 610
Model Form Operating Agreement provides that a party's receipt of written notice
triggers the time period for a party to make an election as to a proposed subsequent
operationm A party proposing to conduct a subsequent operation under a Model
Form Operating Agreement must provide proper written notice to the applicable
parties in order to commence the running of the election period.'
In AcadiEnergy, Inc. v. McCord Exploration Co.,' the Louisiana Court of
Appeal considered the issue of what constitutes proper notice under article VI.B. 1,
"Proposed Operations," of the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating
Agreement so as to trigger the requisite election period. In AcadiEnergy, the non-
operator argued that because the notice under article VI.B.1 of the joint operating
agreement was deficient, the non-operator never declined to participate in the
proposed subsequent well and, therefore, never forfeited its interest in such proposed
subsequent well under the provisions of article VI.B.s The operator claimed that
the non-operator forfeited or relinquished its interest in the proposed subsequent well.
On appeal, the court explained that under article VI.B.1, the parties must be given
written notice of five facts.' 6 These five facts are (1) the work to be performed,
(2) the location of the proposed well, (3) the proposed depth of the proposed well,
(4) the objective formation, and (5) the estimated cost of the operation.'
The court concluded that the non-operator in question had not received written
notice of the requisite five facts as to the proposed well, which was subsequently
drilled and completed. " The party drilling the subsequent well argued that no new
proposal was necessary because the non-operator had indicated it did not like the
objective formation in the well."9 However, the court found that the non-operator
had expressed a desire to participate in the proposed subsequent well if the location
249. ld. at 868-69.
250. Id. at 869.
251. Id.
252. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B; 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B;
1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B; 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 12.
253. Id.
254. 596 So. 2d 1334 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
255. Id. at 1341.
256. Id at 1342.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
[Vol. 54:211
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss2/2
THE MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT
of the well changed.' The non-operator had also requested and received additional
information on the proposed wellV
The appellate court concluded that under the terms of the 1977 Model Form
Operating Agreement, the non-operator did not receive written notice of the requisite
five facts relating to the proposed subsequent well before it was drilled, and could
not make a determination of whether to participate in the well.' Therefore, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that the non-operator did not
decline to participate in the subject well and did not relinquish its interest in such
well under the joint operating agreement.'
D. An Authority for Expenditure Is Proper Notice of Subsequent Operation
In French v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., the Texas Court of Appeals
considered whether an "Authority for Expenditure" (AFE) sent out by an operator in
connection with a proposed subsequent operation under section 12, "Operations By
Less Than All Parties," of the 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating
Agreement met the requirements of this section as to written nkotice of the proposed
operation.
In French, the operator sent out an AFE covering a proposed subsequent well to
be drilled under the joint operating agreement. The AFE set forth the location, the
proposed depth, the objective formation, and the estimated cost of the proposed
subsequent well. The non-operators executed and returned the AFE forms, agreeing
in writing to participate in the proposed subsequent well. Subsequently, the non-
operators refused to pay their proportionate shares of the costs of the subsequent
well. The operator then filed suit against the non-operators for their shares of the
well costs.
The operator argued that execution of the AFE obligated the non-operators to pay
their respective proportionate shares of the costs of the subsequent well. The non-
operators argued that the AFE forms were not sufficient to meet the requirements of
section 12 of the joint operating agreement. The non-operators argued that section
12 not only provided for notice to the parties, but also provided for an election by
the non-operators as to whether they wished to participate in an operation by fewer
than all of the parties to the joint operating agreement. The non-operators asserted
that because the AFE forms were executed before the non-operators knew that all
parties were not participating in the proposed subsequent operation, the elections
made by returning the AFE forms did not bind them.
On appeal, the court characterized the non-operators' argument as an attack on the
sufficiency of the notice given under section 12. The court determined that
according to the non-operators, the notice under section 12 must also show that all
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 439 S.W.2d 448 (rex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1969, writ refd n.r.e.).
265. Id. at 450.
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of the parties were not participating so that a party could know what he agreed to
with respect to the proposed operation.
The court found that the parties agreed that the joint operating agreement was not
ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was not necessary to construe it.' The court
further determined that the AFE forms sent out by the operator met the requirements
of section 12 regarding written notice of the proposed operation. The court
rejected the arguments of the non-operators, finding that the 1956 Model Form
Operating Agreement did not expressly require notice of a failure of the parties to
agree on the proposed subsequent well. Accordingly, the court refused to write
into the joint operating agreement a provision requiring notice of overt failure to
agree regarding a subsequent operation.' The court found that with the exception
of the operation of wells already agreed upon, the procedure to be followed for a
subsequent operation was set forth in section 12." Accordingly, the court upheld
the trial court's decision that the operator gave the non-operators proper notice under
section 12 of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement in regard to the proposed
subsequent operationrq.
E. Proper Election as to a Subsequent Operation
While AcadiEnergy and French addressed the requirements of the written notice
necessary to trigger the election period under the subsequent operations provision of
the Model Form Operating Agreement, the Texas Court of Appeals in C & C
Partners v. Sun Exploration & Production Co.' addressed the requirements for a
non-operator to make a proper election to consent to or to participate in a proposed
subsequent operation under the Model Form Operating Agreement. C & C Partners
involved a non-operator who denied liability for the costs incurred in the drilling of
certain wells under article VI.B, "Subsequent Operations," of the 1977 AAPL Form
610 Model Form Operating Agreement.
266. Id.
267. Ld.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 451.
270. Id. Under the 1977, 1982, and 1989 Model Form Operating Agreements, if less than all parties
approve a proposed subsequent operation, then each "consenting" party may limit its participation and
liability to its interest, or may elect to carry its proportionate share of the "non-consenting" parties'
interests. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B; 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B;
1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B. Furthermore, under these versions of the Model Form
Operating Agreement, the proposing party has. the right to withdraw the proposal in the event of
inadequate participation by the parties. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B; 1982 Model Form,
supra note 9, at art. VI.B; 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B.
271. French, 439 S.W.2d at 451.
272. Id; see aLso M&T, Inc. v. Fuel Res. Dev. Co., 518 F. Supp. 285 (D. Colo. 1981). In M&T,
the court held that the point at which a party may go non-consent is determined, in the absence of an
express written agreement, by industry custom and practice. M&T, 518 F. Supp. at 292. Accordingly,
when the costs incurred in the drilling of a well exceed the estimated costs in the applicable AFE, a
consenting party may not then elect to go non-consent. Id. at 291.
273. 783 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1989, writ denied).
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The non-operator alleged that it had not consented to the subsequent operations
conducted under the joint operating agreement and that such consent was a condition
precedent to the non-operator's liability. In support of its argument, the non-operator
attempted to present testimony in the lower court concerning an alleged industry
practice regarding the use of authorizations for expenditures (AFE) to obtain consent
for drilling and completion expenditures. The trial court excluded this testimony.
The non-operator also attempted to offer testimony that the consent requirements
of article VI.B.l, "Proposed Operations," of the 1977 Model Form Operating
Agreement must be evidenced in writing by means of an AFE. The non-operator
asserted that because no AFE evidencing consent was introduced into evidence, the
operator failed to prove a condition precedent to the non-operator's liability.
Therefore, the operator failed to prove that the non-operator was liable for the costs
incurred. The trial court found in favor of the operator.
In analyzing article VI.B.1 of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement, the
Texas Court of Appeals stated:
We conclude that the contract provisions regarding consent are unam-
biguous. The contracts clearly require consent, but they do not specify
that any particular form of consent is required. Consent by telephone is
permitted but not required under certain circumstances. Any telephoned
notice or response (consent or nonconsent) is required to be confirmed
in writing. Thus, the only requirement of a writing is in the case of
confirmation of consent or nonconsent or confirmation of notice of a
proposed operation. Confirmation of consent is obviously distinct and
separate from consent itself, as to which there is no requirement of a
writing. Moreover, the contract plainly does not state that consent is
invalid or ineffective if it is not confirmed in writing. The provisions on
consent also contain absolutely nothing about AFEsY
Because the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement was unambiguous, the court
was required to give effect to the objective intent of the parties as expressed in their
agreement."
The court determined that the non-operator offered its evidence in an attempt to
alter the provisions regarding consent under article VI.B of the 1977 Model Form
Operating Agreement."6 Because the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement was
unambiguous, the trial court properly excluded the parol evidence!'
274. Id. at 714-15.
275. lIL
276. Id.
277. Id. at 715; see also French, 439 S.W.2d at 450 (holding that a non-operator's execution of an
AFE constituted an election to participate as a consenting party under section 12 of the 1956 Model Form
Operating Agreement); Colo. Springs Nat'l Bank v. Ferebee, 486 P.2d 456, 459 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971)
(holding that a non-operator, who had notice of a proposed drilling program, was deemed to be a non-
consenting party under what appeared to be section 12 of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement
because such party had not expressly elected to be a consenting party).
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The Texas Court of Appeals, in Hill v. Heritage Resources, Inc.,27 rejected the
analysis of the court in C & C Partners. Among many other issues, Hill considered
the form of consent necessary to constitute consent to participate in a proposed
subsequent well under the subsequent operations provision of the 1982 AAPL Form
610 Model Form Operating Agreement.
Heritage, one of the parties to the applicable joint operating agreement, asserted,
in part, that under the provisions of the 1982 Model Form Operating Agreement, a
party could orally consent to participate in the drilling of a subsequent well. In
asserting this argument, Heritage relied upon the analysis in C & C Partners.
The Texas Court of Appeals rejected the argument of Heritage and the analysis set
forth in C & C Partners, basing its rejection upon the unambiguous language of the
1982 Model Form Operating Agreement" The court in Hill determined that the
court in C & C Partners erroneously held that because the applicable Model Form
Operating Agreement was unambiguous and did not specify a particular form of
consent, an oral consent under the subsequent operations provision of the joint
operating agreement was sufficient to obligate or commit a party to participate in a
proposed subsequent well."'
In rejecting the court's analysis in C & C Partners, the court in Hill stated as
follows:
The Dallas Court's conclusion is, however, only dicta, as the question in
that case was whether or not consent had to be evidenced by means of
a AFE [sic]. We certainly agree that consent or non-consent to par-
ticipate in the drilling of a new well does not need to be in any particular
form; however, we disagree that it can be oral. The C & C Partners
Court concluded that the contract provisions only required written confir-
mation of responses to telephonic notices, and that since confirmation of
consent was distinct and separate from consent, there was no requirement
of a writing. This logic fails for two reasons. First, telephonic notices
and responses are limited by the operating agreement to "rework, plug
back or drill deeper" operations and then only when the drill rig is on
location. Article VI.B. 1. Second, article XII of the operating agreement
provides:
"All notices authorized or required between the parties and required
by any of the provisions of this agreement, unless otherwise specifically
provided, shall be given in writing by mail or telegram, postage or
charges prepaid, or by telex or telecopier ...."
We find article XII to plainly require written consent or non-consent
to a proposal to drill a subsequent well."
278. 964 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1997, no writ).
279. Id. at 134.
280. Id. at 133.
281. Id. at 133-34.
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F. Right to Change Election as to a Subsequent Operation
Each version of the subsequent operations provision in the Model Form Operating
Agreements provides that if any applicable party elects not to participate in the
proposed operation, then, in order to receive the benefits of such provision, the
proposed subsequent operation must be commenced within a specified period of time
and completed with due diligence. While it is not specifically stated in each version
of the subsequent operations provision, it appears that if the proposed subsequent
operation is not commenced within the specified time period, the proposal terminates
and any interest relinquished under such subsequent operations provision revests in
or reverts to the party electing or being deemed to have elected to go non-consent.
Questions arise concerning the relationship between a consenting party and a non-
consenting party during the period of time between the end of the election period and
prior to the actual commencement of the proposed subsequent operation.
A particularly instructive case addressing the subsequent operations provision is
Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp.,"2 in which the New Mexico Court of Appeals
construed article VI.B.1 and VI.B.2 of the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form
Operating Agreement. Nearburg (apparently a non-operator) proposed an additional
well under the applicable 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement. Yates (apparently
the designated operator under the joint operating agreement) received Nearburg's
proposal letter on December 1, 1994, but failed to respond within the applicable
thirty-day period. In fact, on December 29, 1994, Yates obtained a drilling permit
to allow Yates to drill the proposed additional well. Yates first contacted Nearburg
concerning the proposed additional well by letter dated January 11, 1995. In this
letter, Yates stated that it proposed to drill the additional well covered by Nearburg's
proposal.
Nearburg filed an action seeking, in part, a judgment declaring Nearburg the
operator of the proposed well and declaring Yates a non-consenting party under the
applicable provisions of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement. Yates
counterclaimed, asserting that it was the operator of the proposed well and was a
consenting party. The district court dismissed Nearburg's complaint with prejudice
and entered a declaratory judgment that Yates was to be considered a consenting
party under the operating agreement. Nearburg appealed the trial court's decision.
On appeal, Yates argued that under the applicable non-consent provisions, an
election not to participate constitutes an offer to relinquish the party's interest in
production from a proposed operation, and that this offer can be accepted by the
proposing party's action in actually commencing work within the election period. 3
Therefore, until Nearburg, the proposing party, accepted Yates' offer by actually
commencing the proposed operation, Yates had the right to change its election by
282. 1997 NMCA 69, 943 P.2d 560.
283. Id. 11, 943 P.2d at 566.
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withdrawing its offer.' Yates argued that it had terminated its offer to relinquish
its interest to Nearburg by its letter of January 11, 1995."
The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected Yates' argument as "a strained
interpretation of the operating agreement."' Specifically, the court of appeals
explained that Yates' argument was inconsistent with the express language of the
Model Form Operating Agreement, which required an election to be made within
thirty days."' Also, Yates' argument failed to account for the fact that by signing
the operating agreement, the parties had agreed to the relinquishment of rights by
operation of the non-consent penalty provisions.'
Nearburg, on the other hand, argued that the subsequent operations provision in the
Model Form Operating Agreement created an option.' Thus, Nearburg's proposal
to jointly drill the proposed well was an offer that Nearburg was bound to keep open
for thirty days.' According to Nearburg, because time was of the essence, Yates'
attempted notification by letter dated January 11, 1995, was too late, and ineffective
to timely exercise the option."'
The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected Nearburg's option analysis as well.
The court explained that if a timely election by Yates would have created a contract
to drill the proposed additional well, then Nearburg's option argument might be
persuasive.' However, the Model Form Operating Agreement did not make it clear
that Nearburg would have been bound to proceed with the drilling of the proposed
well if Yates had made a timely election to participate." The court determined that
if Nearburg was not obligated to proceed with the proposed operation even if Yates
had accepted Nearburg's proposal, it did not constitute an offer and did not confer in
Yates the power to create a contract by acceptance.'
In its analysis, the court of appeals construed the non-consent penalty provisions
under the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement, not as an option, but as a
covenant triggered by a condition precedent, or as a covenant or promise subject to
a condition.?" The court determined that the "covenant" was the agreement by the
non-consenting party to temporarily relinquish the specified amount of its interest in
production in exchange for the consenting party bearing the risk of the operation.'
The "condition" was the election not to participate in the proposed operation.'
284. Id.
285. Id
286, Id. 12, 943 P.2d at 566.
287. l
288. Id.
289. Id. 13, 943 P.2d at 566.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. 15, 943 P.2d at 567.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. 17, 943 P.2d at 567.
296. Id.
297. Id
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In addition, pursuant to the subsequent operations provision, in order to be entitled
to the benefits of article VI.B.2 (providing for the non-consent penalty), the
consenting party must actually commence work on the proposed operation within the
specified time period.& ' The court assumed that this requirement constituted an
additional condition on the application of the non-consent penalty provisions.' The
court construed this condition as wholly within the control of the consenting party.
Thus, if the consenting party commenced operations within the applicable time
period, the consenting party was entitled to the non-consent penalty?' The court
concluded that this condition provided no opportunity for the non-consenting party
to change its election between the end of the applicable notice period" and the date
of actual commencement of operations on the proposed additional well.'
In making its determination, the district court determined that the operating
agreement did not specify whether a party who initially elects to participate in a
proposed well may or may not change that election before the other party has taken
substantial action and suffers harm. °3 The district court found that inadvertence
caused Yates' failure to respond to Nearburg's proposal, and that Yates informed
Nearburg that Yates intended to drill the proposal well before Nearburg suffered any
prejudice.' Thus, Yates could retract or change its election not to participate, and
be treated as a consenting party. Interpreting the operating agreement to the contrary
would effect a forfeiture, which New Mexico law disfavors.'
However, the court of appeals specifically refused to grant Yates equitable relief
by reading into the Model Form Operating Agreement a right to change an election
any time before the other party suffers prejudice, or substantially relies on the
previous non-consent election.' Changing a party's election seemed inconsistent
with the express provisions of article VI.B of the Model Form Operating Agreement,
which established a detailed time schedule and specific deadlines in connection with
a proposed subsequent operation.'
The court of appeals concluded that the relinquishment of Yates' interest under the
subsequent operations provision did not constitute a forfeiture; therefore, the district
court had no basis to use its equitable powers to excuse Yates' failure to make a
timely election.' Under the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Model Form
Operating Agreement, failure to elect to participate in a proposed subsequent
operation within the applicable time period constitutes an election not to participate
298. Id 117, 943 P.2d at 567-68.
299. Id. 17, 943 P.2d at 568.
300. Id.
301. Under the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement, the applicable notice period was thirty
days.
302. Nearburg, 1997 NMCA 69, 17, 943 P.2d at 568.
303. Id. 18, 943 P.2d at 568.
304. Id
305. Id.
306. Id. 24, 943 P.2d at 569.
307. Id. 'I 25, 943 P.2d at 569.
308. Id. 1 30, 943 P.2d at 570-71.
2001]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
and when such condition occurs, the non-consent penalty results.' Thus, Yates'
election to participate in regard to Nearburg's proposal was too late and Yates was
a non-consenting party."'
G. Enforceability of Non-Consent Penalty Provisions
Under the subsequent operations provision in each version of the Model Form
Operating Agreement, if the election period is properly triggered and a party elects
not to participate in the costs of the proposed subsequent operation, then the non-
consenting party relinquishes its interest in, and share of, production from the
subsequent operation until the net proceeds from the sale of such share of production
equal certain percentages (ranging normally from 200% to 500%) of the costs
incurred in such subsequent operation. Consenting parties under the subsequent
operations provision of the Model Form Operating Agreement greatly rely on the
enforceability of these "penalty" provisions.
In Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., " the Texas Court of Appeals evaluated
whether the penalty provisions under section 12, "Operations By Less Than All
Parties," of the 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement were
unenforceable as a matter of law. The court of appeals characterized the penalty
provisions of section 12 as a liquidated damaged clause" 2 To enforce a liquidated
damages clause, the court must find that (1) the breach causes harm that is
impossible or difficult to estimate, and (2) the amount of liquidated damages is a
reasonable prediction of just compensation.3 13
The Hamilton court explained that the penalty provisions contained in section 12
were "designed to compensate for the financial risks that consenting parties to the
J.O.A. are subject to, considering the ultimate possibility that the well may be a
nonproducer.""' Finding the penalty provisions unenforceable as a penalty would
allow non-consenting parties to participate in the venture without risk."
Lastly, the court determined that penalty provisions between 200% and 500% were
standard in the industry" 6 The court concluded that because of the substantial
financial risk suffered by the consenting parties and because the percentage was to
be paid only from production, the 400% penalty provided for in section 12 of the
1956 Model Form Operating Agreement involved in the case was valid and
enforceable? 7
309. Id. 133, 943 P.2d at 571.
310. Id.
311. 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1982, writ refd n.r.c.).
312. Id. at 321.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.; see also In re Sam Oil, Inc., 817 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah 1991) (holding a penalty provision
similar to the subsequent operations provision in the Model Form Operating Agreement was designed
to ensure that non-participating owners do not benefit from the successful outcome of risk they do not
take).
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Nearburg reached the same conclusion as
the Texas Court of Appeals in Hamilton regarding the enforceability of the non-
consent penalty provisions under the Model Form Operating Agreement. In
Nearburg, the New Mexico Court of Appeals analyzed the enforceability of the non-
consent penalty provisions under the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating
Agreement.
While reaching the same conclusion as to enforceability, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals took issue with Hamilton's analysis. In this regard, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals stated as follows:
We note preliminarily that, although we follow custom by referring to
the operating agreement provisions at issue as a "penalty," they do not
meet the definition of a penalty as set forth in the Restatement and
Corbin on Contracts. A penalty is a term fixing unreasonably large
liquidated damages and is ordinarily unenforceable on grounds of public
policy because it goes beyond compensation into punishment. It has been
held that a non-consent penalty similar to the one at issue in this appeal
was a valid liquidated damages provision rather that an unenforceable
penalty provision. We do not agree with the Hamilton court's analysis
because a liquidated damages provision applies in case of a breach of
contract. The parties to the operating agreement are not obligated to
participate in all proposed operations, and a non-consent election cannot
convincingly be characterized as a breach. Therefore, we do not regard
the non-consent penalty provision as involving liquidated damages or an
unenforceable penalty.3 '
The New Mexico court did agree with Hamilton concerning the purpose of the
penalty provisions. The New Mexico court viewed the non-consent penalty as the
agreed-upon reward to the consenting party for taking the risk, and the agreed-upon
delay or limitation of profits incurred by a non-consenting party for avoiding it?"9
The court found that the parties to the joint operating agreement had agreed to reward
the risk taking by temporarily reallocating interests in production until the party
electing to assume the risk received an agreed-upon return on its investment?' The
non-consent penalty provisions under the Model Form Operating Agreement created
a carried interest that rewarded the risk-taking party. 2 '
H. Liability of a Non-Consent Party
Once a non-operator elects (or is deemed to have elected) to go "non-consent"
under the subsequent operations provision of the Model Form Operating Agreement,
all versions of the agreement provide, in essence, that the "consenting" parties bear
318. Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 1997 NMCA 69, 1 10, 943 P.2d 560, 565-66 (citations
omitted).
319. lU 'I 16. 943 P.2d at 567.
320. ld
321. Id.
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the risks associated with conducting the subsequent operations.3' This might lead
a non-operator to assume that upon electing to go "non-consent," such non-operator
would not be liable for any actions taken in connection with the subsequent
operation, especially if the non-consenting party's relinquished interest remained with
the consenting parties who received the production from the subsequent operation.
However, this assumption may not be well founded given certain judicial decisions.
1. Non-Consent Party's Liability for Plugging
In Railroad Commission v. Olin Corp., the Texas Court of Appeals ascertained
the liability for the costs of plugging a gas well of non-operators who had elected to
go non-consent in a reworking operation in the gas well pursuant to article VI.B of
the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement. By going non-consent,
the non-operators relinquished their interests in the well, and their share of production
from the well, until the operator recovered the non-operators' shares of costs plus an
additional percentage of such costs from production proceeds.
In Olin, the operator had reworked the gas well at issue, but the well blew out.
The Texas Railroad Commission subsequently maintained the well. The Commission
issued an order declaring the non-operators jointly and severally liable to control and
plug the well, even though such parties had gone non-consent as to the reworking
operation in the well. The non-operators sought a declaratory judgment interpreting
the Commission's rules and the validity of the above-described order. The trial court
determined that because the non-operators had gone non-consent before the
Commission ordered such parties to plug the subject well, the Commission order was
without authority and void.24
On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals determined that under Texas law, if an
operator of a well cannot be found or is no longer in existence or has no assets with
which to properly plug a well, the Texas Railroad Commission has the power and
authority to order the non-operators to plug the well.3" The court held that under
section 89.002(a)(3) of the Texas Natural Resources Code (the Code), a "non-
operator" was defined as 'a person who owns a working interest in a well at the time
the well is about to be abandoned or ceases operation and is not an operator as
defined in ... this Subsection.""'32 The court also noted that section 89.002(b) also
provides that the terms "operator" and "non-operator" as used in the section 'do not
mean a royalty interest owner or an overriding royalty interest owner.' 32
322. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B; 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B;
1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.B; 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 12.
323. 690 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App. - Austin 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). In Olin Corp. v. Railroad
Commission, 701 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1985), the Texas Supreme Court refused the application for a writ
of error from the decision of the Texas Court of Appeals, approving only the result reached by the court
of appeals regarding the non-consenting parties' liability for the plugging of the subject well.
324. Olin, 690 S.W.2d at 629.
325. Id. at 629-30.
326. Id. at 630 (alteration in original).
327. Id.
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The court resolved two issues on appeal." First, the court decided whether a
carried interest is sufficient as a divestiture of title to remove a party from the
definition of "non-operator." Second, the court decided whether section 89.0002(b)
of the Code exempts only royalty interest and overriding royalty interest owners from
the plugging obligations."z
Regarding the first issue, the court commented on the dearth of authority
discussing what interest a non-consenting working interest owner holds after electing
to go non-consent under the subsequent operations provision of the Model Form
Operating Agreement.? The parties to the appeal characterized each non-
consenting party's retained interest as a "Manahan-type" carried interest.3 ' Agreeing
with the parties, the court explained:
In the Manahan type carried interest, the carried party.. . has a future
interest in a portion of the working interest which is so limited as to
become possessory after the carrying party has recovered certain
specified costs during the payout period... [the carried party retains] a
reversionary interest in part of the working interest, which reversion
occurs when the carrying party has recovered the specified costs during
the payout period?'
The court remarked that the retention of a future interest does not logically amount
to an irrevocable divestiture of title 33 The non-operators retained some property
interest in their working interest, which they then relinquished under the joint
operating agreement in connection with the subsequent operations conducted in the
subject well.3
Turning to the second issue, the court opined that the statute in question exempted
only royalty interest and overriding interest owners from the terms "operator" and
"non-operator." '335 The court pointed out that the language in the statute was
presumed to be selected and used with care.'
Thus, the court held that because the non-operators owned a reversionary interest
in part of the working interest at the time the Commission ordered plugging of the
subject well and because section 89.002(b) exempts only royalty interest and
overriding royalty interest owners from the plugging obligation, the legislature
intended to authorize the Commission to order non-operators who had elected to go
non-consent under the Model Form Operating Agreement to plug the subject well?37
The court concluded that the non-operators could have avoided liability for the
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 631.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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plugging of the subject well had they permanently assigned out all of their interest
in the well."" However, because the non-operators retained part of the working
interest, they were liable for the plugging of the well?39
2. Non-Consent Party's Liability for Pollution
An Oklahoma case, Texaco Inc. v. Beny Petroleum Corp.,' discussed the
analysis set forth in Olin. In Texaco, the designated operator drilled a well under a
1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement. The operator completed
the well in the Morrow-Springer formation, having penetrated the Atoka formation.
Two of the non-operators elected to go non-consent as to the Morrow-Springer
formation in the well.
Texaco originally acquired a working interest in the subject well from the operator
and subsequently acquired the interests of the non-consenting parties as relinquished
under the joint operating agreement. Texaco participated in the subject well as to the
Morrow-Springer formation under the joint operating agreement. The operator
subsequently filed bankruptcy.
The owners of the land on which the subject well was located complained to the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission that the well polluted the ground water
underlying their land. Based upon apparent threats from the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission to take legal action against Texaco and the other working interest
owners in the well, Texaco plugged the well. Texaco sought contribution for the
costs of plugging the subject well from, among others, the non-operators who had
elected to go non-consent in connection with the Morrow-Springer formation in the
well.
In analyzing the liability of the non-operators for the costs associated with the
plugging of the well, the court viewed the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement
as unambiguous. t The non-operators argued that as non-consenting parties as to
the Morrow-Springer formation in the well, Texaco, as a consenting party, could not
seek recovery from them u2 Under article VLB.2, "Operations By Less Than All
Parties," of the joint operating agreement, the consenting parties bore the entire cost
and risk of the subsequent operation. 3 Texaco argued that because the non-
operators retained an interest in the Morrow-Springer formation, liability could be
imposed on such non-operators for the pollution damage resulting from the well.'
Texaco asserted that, as owners of interests in the well, the non-operators remained
liable for the abatement of any nuisance created by the subject well, such as
pollution.4
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. 869 F. Supp. 1523 (W.D. Okla. 1994).
341. Id. at 1528.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
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The court disagreed with Texaco's theory concerning the non-operators' liability,
reiterating the analysis set forth in Olin, supra, concerning article VI.B.2 of the 1977
Model Form Operating Agreement. Namely, although the non-operators had
elected to go non-consent, such election did not divest the parties of their entire
interest in the Morrow-Springer formation in the well.' 7 The court found that
completion of the well in the Morrow-Springer formation triggered the farmout
provisions of the letter agreement, under which the designated operator of the well
acquired the non-operators' interests below the base of the Atoka formation. This
acquired interest included any reversionary interest created by the carried interest
under the Model Form Operating Agreement."
The court concluded that this fact distinguished this case from Olin, in which the
reversionary interest holders did not relinquish their entire interests upon the
occurrence of a special event. 9 The court also stated that without the farmout
provision, it would question whether the non-operators' reversionary interests were
sufficient to impose liability?'" However, because the non-operators had relin-
quished their entire interest, including any reversionary interests, in the Morrow-
Springer formation in the well, the non-consenting owners were not liable for any
pollution emanating from any formation where the non-operators were non-
consenting parties."' Alternatively, the court suggested that the non-consenting
owners could be held liable for pollution emanating from formations encountered in
the subject well where such non-operators retained their working interests3 2
IX. The Right to Take Production in Kind
Each version of the Model Form Operating Agreement contains a provision dealing
with a party's right to take in kind, or separately dispose of, such party's proportionate
share of the oil and gas produced from a well covered by the operating
agreement." Furthermore, this provision allows the operator to purchase or sell to
another purchaser a party's proportionate share of the oil and gas produced from any
346. l& at 1528-29.
347. Id. at 1529.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 1529-30.
350. Id. at 1530.
351. lit
352. Id. In Texaco, the court found that the provisions of the 1977 Model Form Operating
Agreement, which provided for liability based on the percentage of ownership as set forth in the
agreement, altered the contribution scheme called for by Oklahoma statutes and Oklahoma Corporation
Commission rules. lit at 1531; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. § 832(B) (1991); OCC-OGR 165:10-11-3. The
court concluded that while this particular statute and Oklahoma Corporation Commission rule may
impose joint and several liability on parties for the plugging of wells, the parties are free to contract as
they wish in regard to a contribution scheme. Texaco, 869 F. Supp. at 1531. The court found that any
recovery by Texaco from the non-operators was limited to the percentages listed in the Model Form
Operating Agreement. Id.
353. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.G ("Taking Production in Kind"); 1982 Model
Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.C (same); 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.C ("Right to Take
Production in Kind"); 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 13 (same).
20011
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
well covered by the operating agreement when such party has failed to make
arrangements for the taking in kind, or separately disposing of, such party's
proportionate share.
Under the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement, if a party fails to take in kind
or otherwise dispose of its share of the oil and gas and the operator exercises its right
to sell such party's proportionate share of the oil and gas to a third-party purchaser,
the operator is obligated to sell such gas "at not less than the market price prevailing
in the area, which shall in no event be less than the price which Operator receives
for its portion of the oil and gas produced from the Unit Area."3
The 1977 and 1982 Model Form Operating Agreements provide that if the operator
exercises its right to sell a party's share of the oil and gas to a third party purchaser,
the operator must sell the non-taking party's share of the oil and gas "at the best price
obtainable in the area for such production. "3 "s The 1989 Model Form Operating
Agreement provides that if the operator elects to sell to a third-party purchaser a non-
taking party's proportionate share of the oil and gas, such sale "shall be in a manner
commercially reasonable under the circumstances, but Operator shall have no duty
to share any existing market.., or to obtain a price.. . equal to that received under
any existing market .... ."
A. Resolution of Conflict Between Ownership Provision and Taking-in-Kind
Provision
In Harrell v. Samson Resources Co.,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court faced the
issue of whether a gas balancing dispute should be resolved by allowing balancing-in-
kind, pre-depletion cash balancing, or cash balancing upon depletion. As part of its
decision, the court had to determine the legal relationship of the working interest
owners under the terms of a 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement. Specifically,
the court addressed the apparent conflict between section 4, "Interest of Parties," and
section 13, "Right to Take Production in Kind," of the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement.
In Harrell, the parties entered into a 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement,
without a gas balancing agreement. Conoco served as the designated operator of the
Deputy No. 21-1 well. Plaintiffs, as working interest owners in such well, contracted
to sell their share of the gas to Producers Gas Company, while Samson contracted
to sell its share of the gas from such well to El Paso Natural Gas Company. Because
of a contract dispute with Producers, plaintiffs did not sell any gas from the Deputy
No. 21-1 well for almost two years, with 100% of the gas for such time period being
allocated to Samson and its purchaser, El Paso. Plaintiffs were in an underproduced
status as to gas balancing.
354. 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 13 ("Right to Take Production in Kind").
355. 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.C ("Taking Production in Kind"); 1977 Model Form,
supra note 9, at art. VI.C ("Right to Take Production in Kind").
356. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.G ("Taking Production in Kind").
357. 1998 OK 69, 980 P.2d 99.
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At the time Samson was overproduced for purposes of gas balancing, Samson
attempted to sell its interest in the Deputy No. 21-1 well at an auction. Plaintiffs
objected to the attempted sale and demanded cash balancing from Samson.
Eventually, plaintiffs filed suit against Samson, presenting the trial court with the
issue of cash balancing. The trial court ordered pre-depletion cash balancing, but the
court of appeals reversed the decision, holding that plaintiffs' claim for cash
balancing was time barred. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court considered the working interest owners in the
Deputy No. 21-1 well as cotenants as to the oil and gas produced and sold from such
well by virtue of section 4 of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement covering
such well 5 The court relied upon the specific language in section 4 providing that
"all production of oil and gas from the Unit Area, subject to the payment of lessor's
royalties, shall also be owned by the parties" as their interests are set forth in Exhibit
A to the operating agreemente" The court concluded that this ownership clause of
the operating agreement created a cotenancy as to production from the contract
area.3
6
The court further pointed out that section 13, "Right to Take Production in Kind,"
of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement provided that each owner shall take
such party's share of production in kind and separately dispose of it." The court
concluded that section 4 and section 13 of the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement appeared to be contradictory with respect to the legal relationship between
the parties.' The court stated that .the ownership clause, section 4, created a
cotenancy in the oil and gas produced, but the take-in-kind provision, section 13, was
antithetical to a cotenant relationship.' The court recognized that requiring each
owner to take and separately market such owner's gas could cause gas imbalances to
occur and that the operating agreement in question contained no provision for gas
balancing among the separately selling owners.
The court relied upon Professor Eugene Kuntz who had previously written that
"take-in-kind" provisions were included in operating agreements to avoid the tax
consequences of being classified as an association taxable as a corporation.e
Professor Kuntz recognized the general assumption that a party who takes in kind
owns the gas taken, while the gas of the party not taking in kind remains in the
ground. However, Professor Kuntz further noted that in the absence of a specific
358. Id. 8, 980 P.2d at 102.
359. Id.
360. Id. 9, 980 P.2d at 103. The Oklahoma Supreme Court further pointed out that while the 1956
Model Form Operating Agreement created a cotenancy between the parties, the ownership clause in each
of the 1977 and 1982 Model Form Operating Agreements specifically provides that such agreement shall
not be deemed a cross-conveyance of interests. Id.; see aLro Reserve Oil, Inc. v. Dixon, 711 F.2d 951
(10th Cir. 1983).
361. Harrell, 1998 OK 69, 1 10, 980 P.2d at 103.
362. Id. 111,980 P.2d at 103.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. 1 12, 980 P.2d at 103.
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balancing agreement, the usual operating agreement does not express such
intention.' The court also relied on Professor Kuntz's observation that the
ownership provision has the literal effect of making the owners cotenants in the oil
and gas produced, which would render the taking-in-kind provision meaningless.6 7
The court decided to reconcile section 4 and section 13 of the 1956 Model Form
Operating Agreement by finding that the ownership clause created a cotenant-like
relationship between the parties as to the gas sold, but that each owner had the right
to separately take and market its own share, subject only to a duty to account to the
other owners.' After establishing the legal relationship of the parties under the
1956 Model Form Operating Agreement, the court concluded that the trial court's
judgment allowing pre-depletion cash balancing at a weighted average price did not
go against the clear weight of the evidence.' *
B. Fair Market Value or Best Price Obtainable for a Party's Share of Oil and
Gas Sold by Operator
Under all forms of the Model Form Operating Agreement, if a party does not take
in kind or separately dispose of such party's proportionate share of the oil and gas
produced from a well covered by the operating agreement, the operator has the right,
but not the obligation, to sell such party's proportionate share to a third party?' In
Holloway v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the Texas Court of Appeals interpreted the
language contained in the 1977 and 1982 Model Form Operating Agreements
concerning the obligations of an operator who has exercised its right to sell a non-
taking party's proportionate share of oil and gas to a third-party purchaser "for the
account of the non-taking party at the best price obtainable in the area for such
production." m
In Holloway, Henderson Clay Products (HCP) entered into an agreement with
B&A, a wholly owned subsidiary, to market HCP's gas at the maximum lawful price
per MMbtu, which was $6.50. B&A entered into a contract with Ensearch, under
which B&A dedicated its gas to Ensearch to be purchased at an agreed price.
Subsequently, HCP entered into a 1977 or 1982 Model Form Operating Agreement
with various working interest owners, including Holloway.373
366. lit
367. Id.
368. ld. ' 13, 980 P.2d at 103. While the court did not address any claims under Oklahoma's
Sweetheart Gas Act, 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 544-547 (1991) (renumbered to 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 581.7-
581.10 by Laws 1992, ch. 190, § 29), the court noted that the Act created a statutory cotenancy as to gas
produced after the effective date of such act, May 3, 1983. d
369. d '132, 980 P.2d at 108.
370. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.G; 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.C;
1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.C; 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 13.
371. 970 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App. - Tyler 1998, no writ).
372. 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.C; 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.C.
373. It is difficult to determine from the reported case whether the Model Form Operating
Agreement involved was a 1977 or 1982 form. In any event, the applicable language is the same in each
form.
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In the mid-1980s, oil and gas prices fell drastically and Ensearch breached its gas
contract with B&A, resulting in B&A suing Ensearch to enforce the contract. Arco
purchased HCP and B&A, which resulted in a settlement of the lawsuit with
Ensearch. Ensearch agreed to take higher quantities of gas at a lower price, $2.90 per
MMbtu.
Arco, as operator under the operating agreement, marketed the proportionate share
of oil and gas of the mineral interest owners, including Holloway, at the lower price
for a short period of time, but then completely discontinued these marketing efforts.
Holloway sued Arco, alleging in part that Arco, as operator, breached the provisions
of the applicable operating agreement by failing to market his gas at "the best price
obtainable in the area" pursuant to the agreement. Holloway asserted that the best
price obtainable in the area was the price under the original gas contract between
B&A and Ensearch and that when Arco, as operator, amended the gas contract with
Ensearch in settlement of the lawsuit, resulting in Holloway receiving a lower price,
Arco violated the provisions of the operating agreement.
The Texas Court of Appeals determined that as a matter of law, "when a gas well
owner reserves the right to take the production of the well in kind, the production of
that well is not dedicated."3 ' The court further stated that if the gas is not
dedicated, an owner cannot enforce against the operator the original contract between
the operator and its subsidiary or its subsidiary and the gas purchaser. 5 The court
concluded that the best price obtainable could have been, but was not necessarily, the
unenforced contract price of $6.50 per MMbtu" 7
Furthermore, the court concluded that Arco had established that it sold Holloway's
gas for amounts equal to or exceeding the fair market value for undedicated gas."
However, the court stated that "market price" and "best price obtainable" are not
synonymous terms?7' The court reasoned that, by the exercise of reasonable effort,
a seller can obtain more favorable terms than fair market value for gas produced and
sold.3'
The court concluded that although Arco did not breach any duty to Holloway for
its failure to seek enforcement of the B&A contract, Arco had failed to offer any
evidence that the original higher contract price was not the best price obtainable in
the area, or that it could not have obtained that higher price for Holloway." The
court stated that although the price Arco obtained for Holloway's gas may have been
the best price obtainable in the area, Arco did not present evidence of that fact.
Therefore, the lower court improperly granted summary judgment0 ' Accordingly,
374. Holloway, 970 S.W.2d at 644.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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the court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision granting summary judgment
on this issue.3"
X. Abandonment of Wells; Delay Rental, Shut-in Well Payments, and Minimum
Royalties; and Surrender of Leases
Each version of the Model Form Operating Agreement contains a provision dealing
with the plugging and abandonment of wells.' This provision limits a party's right
to plug and abandon certain wells. The provision also gives a party the right, under
certain conditions, to assume operations of a well if the well is proposed to be
plugged and abandoned and the parties disagree as to whether the well should be
plugged and abandoned.
Each version of the Model Form Operating Agreement also contains a provision
dealing with the payment of delay rentals, shut-in well payments, and minimum
royalties under the oil and gas leases covered by the agreement. This provision
addresses the consequences of a party's failure to make proper payment of any delay
rental, shut-in well payment, or minimum royalty. Furthermore, this provision
imposes upon the operator certain obligations to notify the non-operators when a well
is shut-in and when a well is returned to production.'
Furthermore, each version of the Model Form Operating Agreement contains a
provision limiting the right of a party to surrender, in whole or in part, any oil and
gas lease covered by the agreement. Under this provision, if a party desires to
surrender an oil and gas lease covered by the joint operating agreement, the other
parties have the right to acquire the lease.'
A. Operator's Duty to Notify Non-Operator of Abandonment of Well
Section 16, "Abandonment of Wells," of the 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form
Operating Agreement was interpreted and differentiated from section 17, "Delay
Rentals and Shut-in Well Payments," of such agreement in Norman v. Apache
Corp.3"M Norman involved an operator who, in July 1990, decided to terminate
production from a well drilled under the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement.
In December 1990, the operator informed the non-operators that the well had been
shut-in and was to be plugged and abandoned. The non-operators requested that the
382. Id.
383. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.E ("Abandonment of Wells"); 1982 Model Form,
supra note 9, at art. VI.E (same); 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VI.E (same); 1956 Model
Form, supra note 9, § 16 ("Abandonment of Wells").
384. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at arts. IV.B.2, VII.E ("Loss by Non-Payment or Erroneous
Payment of Amount Due" and "Rentals, Shut-in Well Payments and Minimum Royalties" respectively);
1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at arts. IV.B.2, VII.F (same); 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at arts.
IV.B.2, VII.F (same); 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 17 ("Delay Rentals and Shut-in Well
Payments") (joint loss version and individual loss version).
385. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VIL.A ("Surrender of Leases"); 1982 Model Form,
supra note 9, at art VIL.A (same); 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art VIL.A (same); 1956 Model
Form, supra note 9, § 24 (same).
386. 19 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1994).
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operator continue operation of the well, but subsequently learned that the operator
had already ceased operations on the well. Furthermore, the specific periods of time
for the commencement of additional operations under the applicable leases had
expired resulting in the loss of the leases.
The non-operators sued the operator, alleging, in part, breach of contractual duties
under the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement. Specifically, the non-operators
alleged that the operator had breached the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement
by failing to notify the non-operators under section 17, "Delay Rentals and Shut-in
Well Payments," when the operator shut-in the subject well. The non-operators
contended that the operator's termination of production in July 1990, constituted a
"shut-in" of the subject well and was covered by section 17. The operator argued that
it did not "shut-in" the subject well as contemplated in section 17, but instead
"abandoned" the well and was thus subject to the provisions of section 16 of the joint
operating agreement.
The district court concluded that the term "shut-in," as used in section 17, did not
contemplate the permanent cessation of production."7 Accordingly, the trial court
found in favor of the operator."
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit court explained that under section 17 of the 1956
Model Form Operating Agreement, the operator had an obligation to promptly notify
each working interest owner when a well was shut-in."' However, section 16 of
the agreement did not impose upon the operator a contractual duty to notify the non-
operators when it abandoned a well (i.e., ceased production permanently)?' °
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower court that the term "shut-in"
is a generic term used to refer to the closing of the valves through which oil and gas
flow through a well. 9' The term also has a legal meaning that refers to the closing
of valves "when production at a well capable of producing in paying quantities is
temporarily halted to repair or clean the well to allow reservoir pressure to build, or
for lack of market."9
The court of appeals emphasized that the express language of section 17 also
supported the conclusions of the lower court.3' The court noted that the agreement
phrased the mandatory notice requirement in section 17 in the conjunctive, thus
requiring the operator to promptly notify each non-operator of (1) the date on which
any gas well located on the unit was shut-in, (2) the reason for the shut-in, and (3)
the date on which the well was restored to production? ' In everyday usage, the
term "restores" means "to bring back into existence or use," "to reestablish," or "to
bring back to an original condition."39S The court concluded that the third re-
387. Id. at 1027.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. (citing Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 872 F.2d 655, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1989)).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id at 1028.
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quirement of the notice provision and the fact it was joined conjunctively to the other
two requirements indicates that section 17 contemplates a temporary cessation of
production.'"
Having found that section 17 of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement
contemplated only a temporary cessation of production, the appellate court
determined that section 16 of the agreement governed the operator's duty with respect
to giving notice to the non-operators that production from the subject well had
permanently ceased and the operator intended to abandon the well?' In the court's
opinion, section 16 did not mandate that the operator give the non-operators notice
of an impending lease termination because of the operator's intent to plug and
abandon the well."" Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not
err in granting the operator summary judgment on the issue.'"
B. Operator's Duty to Notify Non-Operator of Impending Lease Termination -
Surrender of Lease Versus Termination of Lease
As noted above, the court in Norman relied in part upon the analysis set forth in
Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co." In Fuller, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit interpreted and applied the provisions of section 16, "Abandonment of Wells,"
and section 24, "Surrender of Leases," of the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement:
In this case, the test well covered by the Model Form Operating Agreement ceased
production in January 1983 because of a casing leak. The two oil and gas leases of
the operator expired by their own terms in March 1983 due to the cessation of
production from the leased premises. The operator notified the non-operator in April
1983 of its intent to plug and abandon the test well. The non-operator objected to the
operator plugging and abandoning the test well. Despite the non-operator's objection,
the operator plugged and abandoned the test well, and the non-operator subsequently
filed suit against the operator claiming that the operator breached the 1956 Model
Form Operating Agreement.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the non-operator asserted that, as a matter of law,
the operator breached the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement by failing to notify
the non-operator of the operator's intent to plug and abandon the test well prior to the
expiration of the operator's two oil and gas leases in the unit area. The non-operator
argued that the operator had an obligation under the joint operating agreement to
396. Id. In addition, the appellate court observed that no Fifth Circuit or Texas case had even
insinuated that the term "shut-in," as used in the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement, referred to the
permanent cessation of production. Id.
397. Id at 1029.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. 872 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1989).
401. The parties to the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement involved in this case had apparently
deleted a provision after section 16, but before section 24. The deleted provision was probably section
18, "Preferential Right to Purchase," with the remaining provisions renumbered accordingly. Therefore,
section 24 of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement was evidently renumbered to section 23.
[Vol. 54:211
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss2/2
THE MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT
notify the non-operator that both of the operator's oil and gas leases would expire at
the end of sixty days following the cessation of production from the test well. The
non-operator based this argument on sections 16 and 24 (renumbered to 23) in the
1956 Model Form Operating Agreement.
In analyzing the non-operator's argument, the appellate court noted that the 1956
Model Form Operating Agreement did not contain an express provision requiring an
operator to notify a non-operator of an impending lease termination. Thus, the
non-operator in this case asked the court to imply such a duty based upon other
provisions of the joint operating agreement. 3
With regard to section 16, the appellate court concluded that this section expressly
mandated only notice of a party's intent to plug and abandon a well, and did not
require notice of an impending lease termination.' In support of its conclusion, the
court noted that other provisions of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement
directly recognized the possibility of the occurrence of the expiration or loss of an
underlying lease. The court held that section 16 did not impose upon the
operator, directly or by implication, any duty to notify the non-operator of its intent
to plug and abandon the test well while the underlying leases of the operator were
still valid."a The court found that the operator had notified the non-operator of its
intent to plug and abandon the subject well in accordance with the provisions of
section 16 and that the operator had not breached this section of the joint operating
agreement.'
The non-operator also asserted that the operator breached the provisions of section
24 (renumbered to 23), "Surrender of Leases." The court found that the "Surrender
of Leases" provision required the consent of all parties before the surrender, in whole
or in part, of any lease affecting the unit area covered by the joint operating
agreement, or in the absence of such consent, the assignment of such lease to the
non-consenting parties.' The non-operator asserted that the operator's action in
allowing the operator's oil and gas leases to terminate due to cessation of production
from the test well constituted an affirmative surrender of the operator's leases,
requiring the consent of all parties to the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement.
In analyzing this argument, the court of appeals explained the legal difference
between the terms "surrender" and "termination" of a lease. The term "surrender,"
as used in the oil and gas industry, refers to a lessee's contractual right to voluntarily
relinquish all or a part of the leased premises to the lessor.4 " This permits the
402. Fuller, 872 F.2d at 657.
403. I.
404. Id. at 659.
405. Id. The other provisions referenced by the court were section 2.B, "Failure of Title," section
2.C, "Loss of Leases For Other Than Title Failure," section 17, "Delay Rentals and Shut-in Well
Payment," and section 23 (renumbered to 22), "Renewal or Extension of Leases."
406. Fuller, 872 F.2d at 659.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. ld.
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"lessee to keep the most profitable portion of the lease and give up the least profitable
portion.4t' The court concluded that a surrender of an oil and gas lease may only
occur while the lease is in effect.412 In contrast, "termination" of an oil and gas
lease refers to the expiration of the lease by its own terms.413 This expiration is
triggered by the operator's failure to maintain operations on the leased premises.4"
The court concluded that the operator's oil and gas leases in this case expired by
virtue of the express terms of the leases, which provided for termination in the event
of the cessation of operations on the leased premises.!1 5 The court determined that
the "Surrender of Leases" provision of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement
did not apply and did not impose a duty on the operator to notify the non-operator
of the impending termination of the operator's oil and gas leases.4 6
C. Surrender of Lease Versus Assignment of Lease
In Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc.,""' the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit analyzed section 24, "Surrender of Leases," of the 1956 AAPL Form
610 Model Form Operating Agreement in the context of an assignment of an oil and
gas lease subject to the joint operating agreement. In Pasternak, plaintiff acquired an
oil and gas lease from defendant under a farmout agreement made subject to a 1956
Model Form Operating Agreement. Plaintiff subsequently drilled two wells. The
non-operators to the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement claimed interests in the
wells by virtue of the joint operating agreement.
Plaintiff claimed that the farmout from defendant constituted a surrender of a lease
in the unit area as contemplated by section 24, "Surrender of Leases," in the 1956
Model Form Operating Agreement Plaintiff also claimed that by operation of the
final portion of section 24, the acreage on which the two wells of plaintiff were
located was no longer subject to the joint operating agreement.
The Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiffs analysis of section 24.!"8 The court found
that defendant had not surrendered its leasehold interest, but had assigned the
leasehold interest to plaintiff.4 9 Plaintiff had then agreed to conduct exploration and
drilling operations on the leasehold, with defendant retaining an overriding royalty
interest. The court concluded that section 24 of the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement did not apply to the assignment from defendant to plaintiff!2 Accor-
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 660.
414. Id.
415. ld.
416. Id.
417. 790 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1986).
418. Id. at 834.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
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dingly, defendant's interest remained subject to the Model Form Operating
Agreement. 4"
XI. Liens and Payment Defaults
Each version of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement contains
a provision granting to the operator and to each of the non-operators a lien on and
a security interest in the various oil and gas interests, personal property, fixtures, oil
and gas as produced, and proceeds covered by the Model Form Operating
Agreement.' This provision in each version of the Model Form Operating
Agreement ensures that the parties who pay the costs and expenses incurred in
connection with any operation have some security against which they may collect
from a defaulting party or be reimbursed for expenses paid on behalf of a defaulting
party.
A. Perfection of Operator's Contractual Lien
In Amarex, Inc. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,424 the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court
the following question of law:
May the operator of an oil and gas lease perfect its contractual operator's
lien against the interest of another working interest owner by filing a lien
in the form of a mechanic's and materialman's lien statement, 42 O.S. §§
144, 146 (1981), or must the operator perfect its interest within the
recording statutes as an instrument affecting real estate? 16 O.S. §§ 93,
94, 95, and 96. Stated another way, must an oil and gas operator comply
with real estate recording requirements or those of statutory oil and gas
lien statements in order to perfect a contractual, consensual joint
operator's lien against the interest of another working interest owner.4
The Oklahoma Supreme Court answered the above-described certified question
specifically in regard to the contractual lien granted under article V1I.B, "Liens and
Payment Defaults," of the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Agreement. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the operator's lien created by the 1977 Model
422. Id.; see also Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992). In Stine, the Fifth
Circuit analyzed article VIII.A, "Surrender of Leases," of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement
in the context of an assignment of oil and gas leases subject to the joint operating agreement. The court
found that logic dictates that a party does not abandon property by attempting to sell that property; the
intent to surrender property is patently inconsistent with the intent to sell it. Stine, 976 F.2d at 265-66.
The court concluded that article VIII.A of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement did not apply to
the oil and gas lease as assigned. Id.
423. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.B ("Liens and Security Interests"); 1982 Model
Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.B ("Liens and Payment of Defaults"); 1977 Model Form, supra note 9,
at art. VII.B (same); 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § 9 ("Operator's Lien").
424. 772 P.2d 905 (Okla. 1989).
425. Id. at 906.
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Form Operating Agreement was a contractual lien on oil and gas leases!' The
court reasoned that because an oil and gas lease creates an interest in real property,
the appropriate place to file a contract granting a contractual lien against an oil and
gas lease is in the land records of the county in which the leasehold is located.'27
The court stated that the joint operating agreement, as the contract creating the
lien, is the preferred instrument to be filed in the land records.' The court
emphasized the importance of having the joint operating agreement, as filed, signed
by the owner of the property encumbered by the contractual lien granted by such
agreement.'
The court further stated that while the filing of the joint operating agreement is the
preferred method of perfecting the contractual lien granted thereunder, the contractual
lien will be perfected against the leasehold intended to be encumbered by the filing
of another document in the land records of the county where the leasehold is
located.' This document must be executed by the owner of the interest burdened
by the lien, must fully describe the terms of the lien and the leases and lands encum-
bered, and must be executed, attested, and acknowledged in accordance with the
applicable recording statutes.!"' The court pointed out that under the Oklahoma
statutory scheme, every instrument made by a corporation affecting real estate must
be executed as provided by title 16 of the Oklahoma Statutes.!"
In this case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that because no lien statement
or operating agreement executed by the owner of the interest to be burdened was
filed in the land records of the appropriate county, the operator under the joint
operating agreement in question failed to perfect its contractual operator's lien as
granted in article VU.B of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement.'33 The court
pointed out that although the operator failed to perfect its contractual lien under the
1977 Model Form Operating Agreement, this failure did not necessarily preclude the
operator from obtaining and perfecting a lien for labor performed and materials
furnished under the joint operating agreement. These liens would be obtained
pursuant to an entirely separate and independent statutory procedure set forth in
sections 144 and 146, title 42 of the Oklahoma Statutes.'2'
The version of article VII.B in the 1989 Model Form Operating Agreement
specifically mandates that each of the parties execute and acknowledge a recording
426. Id.
427. Id. at 908.
428. Id.
429. flt at 908-09.
430. Id. at 909.
431. Il
432. Id.
433. Id.; see also Enduro Oil Co. v. Parish & Ellison, 834 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex. Civ. App. -
Houston 1992, writ denied) (holding that the operator under a 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement
had not converted a non-operator's share of proceeds from a producing well when the operator retained
such proceeds and applied them to the non-operator's share of unpaid well costs because the operator had
a lien upon and the right to collect the non-operator's share of the proceeds from the sale under article
VII.B, "Liens and Payment Defaults," of the joint operating agreement).
434. Amarex, 772 P.2d at 909.
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supplement and any financing statements necessary to perfect the liens and security
interests granted in the agreement. This provision also authorizes the operator to file
the Model Form Operating Agreement or the recording supplement as a lien or
mortgage in the applicable real estate records, and as a financing statement with the
proper office under the Uniform Commercial Code. The 1989 Model Form Operating
Agreement clearly intends to give effect to the Oklahoma Supreme Court's ruling in
Amarex and ensure that each of the parties has adequate protection by perfecting the
contractual liens and security interests granted in such agreement.
B. Constructive Notice of Unrecorded Operator's Contractual Lien
As indicated in Amarex, recordation of the agreement itself in the appropriate real
estate records provides the surest method of perfecting the contractual lien granted
under the Model Form Operating Agreement. However, the operator's contractual lien
under the Model Form Operating Agreement may still have priority over other
lienholders even though the agreement is not filed of record if reference to the
agreement is contained in a recorded instrument in the chain of title to the property
involved.
The Texas Court of Appeals addressed such a situation in MBank Abilene, N.A.
v. Westwood Energy, Inc.,"" In MBank, what appears to be a Model Form
Operating Agreement granted the operator a first and prior lien against the interest
of each party to the operating agreement. The parties did not record the agreement.
One of the non-operators secured a debt to the bank through a deed of trust covering
several of the oil and gas leases covered by the joint operating agreement.
Furthermore, the non-operator assigned all its interest in the oil and gas produced and
sold from the subject oil and gas leases as security to the bank.
The operator sued the non-operator to collect for expenses incurred in operations
under the joint operating agreement and to foreclose the contractual lien on the
leasehold interests. The bank, joined as a defendant, asserted that it had a superior
lien to the lien claimed by the operator under the unrecorded joint operating
agreement.
The Texas Court of Appeals determined that in assignments within the chain of
title to the subject oil and gas leases, references were made to the applicable joint
operating agreement!' The court concluded that the bank was "bound by every
recital, reference and reservation contained in or fairly disclosed by any instrument
that formed an essential link in the chain of title under which [the bank
claimed]."'" The court held that the bank had notice of the liens contained in the
prior unrecorded joint operating agreement because such agreement was referred to
in instruments that formed an essential link in the chain of title under which the bank
claimed.4 ' Therefore, the contractual lien granted to the operator by the joint
435. 723 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1986, no writ).
436. Id. at 250.
437. Id. (quoting Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982)).
438. Id.
20011
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
operating agreement was found to be superior to the lien granted to the bank by the
non-operator.439
XII Limitation on Expenditures and Activities
Each version of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement contains
a provision limiting the type of operation or activity the parties may conduct under
the agreement. This limitation depends on either the type of well involved or the
estimated cost of the proposed operation or activity." °
A. Operator's Duty to Notify Non-Operators of Rework Operation
In LPCX Corp. v. Faulkner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted section
11, "Limitation on Expenditures," of the 1956 AAPL Form 610 Model Form
Operating Agreement. In LPCX, the operator had drilled a commercially productive
well. The operator performed a workover operation on the well for the express
purpose of repairing a casing leak. The operator did not notify the non-operators
prior to the commencement of the rework operation.
After the operator completed repair of the casing leak, the well only produced
sporadically. The non-operators informed the operator that, in their opinions, it was
not prudent to continue to operate the well with such limited production. Eventually,
the non-operators sued the operator alleging, in part, that the rework operation, an
attempt to correct a casing leak, was both unnecessary and unauthorized under the
provisions of section 11 of the joint operating agreement.
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the jury's determination that,
based on the evidence presented, section 11 of the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement had been breached."1 The court explained that section 1 (b) of the 1956
Model Form Operating Agreement provided that no well was to be reworked except
in accordance with section 12, "Operations By Less Than All Parties," of the
agreement."3
Although no party claimed that the provisions of section 12 were complied with,
the court found that the non-operators had demonstrated that the provisions of section
439. Id.; see also Syring v. Sartorious, 277 N.E.2d 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971). In Syring, the court
found that the lien granted under an operating agreement, with language similar to that contained in
section 9, "Operator's Lien," of the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement, was not a mechanic's lien,
but was a contractual lien on the proceeds from the sale of the oil and gas produced under the operating
agreement. Syring, 277 N.E.2d at 458. The court characterized the lien on the proceeds arising from
future sales of oil and gas produced under the operating agreement as an equitable lien on the property
not yet in existence at the time the parties entered the operating agreement. Id. The court determined
that the lien was enforceable on the property when acquired at a subsequent time. Id.
440. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at arts. VI.C, VI.D ("Completion of Wells; Reworking and
Plugging Back" and "Other Operations" respectively); 1982 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.D;
1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.D; 1956 Model Form, supra note 9, § I I ("Limitation on
Expenditures").
441. 818 P.2d 431 (Okla. 1991).
442. Id. at 435.
443. Id. at 436.
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11 had, in fact, been violated.' Specifically, the operator did not attempt to show
prior notification of the reworking operation as provided for in section 11 (c) of the
joint operating agreement.44
Furthermore, section 11(c) of the joint operating agreement provided that the
operator could not undertake any single project reasonably estimated to require an
expenditure in excess of $10,000 without the consent of all parties. The court found
that the non-operators had produced evidence that the operator could reasonably
expect the rework operation to cost more than the dollar limitation specified in
section I 1(c), and that the operator actually spent more than four and one-half times
such limitation.4' Thus, the court found that the jury was justified in determining
that section 1 l(c) of the joint operating agreement had been violated as to prior
notification of the rework operation. 47
The operator further contended that repairing parted casing was not a rework
operation as contemplated in section 11 of the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement. However, the operator's own witness testified that the casing leak repairs
were workover operations and that a workover rig had been used to make the casing
leak repairs.4 The operator also argued that repairing the casing leak was an
emergency and thus not subject to the prior notification provisions of section 11.4"
Yet the non-operator's witness testified that the information provided by the operator
on the well's status at the time the leak was present did not show emergency
conditions.4'
Finally, the court rejected the operator's contention that only section 12,
"Operations By Less Than All Parties," of the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement applied because the non-operators were non-consenting parties, thus not
needing notification.45' The court determined that section 12 only applied if all
parties could not agree upon the reworking of a dry hole or a well not then producing
in paying quantities.452 The court further determined that section 12, by its express
language, was inapplicable in this case because the parties failed to present evidence
showing that the subject well was not producing in paying quantities, or was not
capable of producing in paying quantities, during the relevant times.4 Accordingly,
the court upheld the jury's determination that the operator breached the joint operating
agreement by the method in which the operator performed the workover.4
444. Id.
445. Md At trial, the operator presented evidence of drilling reports, showing work in progress, in
an attempt to show compliance with the notice requirement under section I 1(c). The jury rejected this
evidence, and the court agreed with the jury's determination. Id.
446. Md
447. id.
448. Id.
449. 14
450. let
451. i
452. id. at 436-37.
453. Id. at 437.
454. Id.
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B. Approval Necessary for Rework Operation
In Texstar North America, Inc. v. Ladd Petroleum Corp.,5 the Texas Court of
Appeals determined the conditions that had to exist before a well could be reworked
under the 1982 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement. In Texstar, the
operator fracture stimulated a well covered by the joint operating agreement while
the well was producing in paying quantities. One of the non-operators objected to the
fracture stimulation and refused to pay its proportionate share of the costs of the
operation.
The Texas Court of Appeals, in analyzing article VII.D.2, "Rework or Plug Back,"
of the 1982 Model Form Operating Agreement, found the provision unambiguous and
enforceable according to its terms.4 The court considered the fracture procedure
a "rework" procedure as that term is used in article VII.D.2 of the joint operating
agreement.4
The court further explained that article VI.D.2 provided, in relevant part, that
"[w]ithout the consent of all parties, no well shall be reworked or plugged back
except a well reworked or plugged back pursuant to the provisions of article VI.B.2
of this agreement.""45 The court found that article VI.B.2 of the 1982 Model Form
Operating Agreement concerned only those wells not producing in paying quan-
tities.459 Therefore, because the operator fracture stimulated the subject well while
it was producing in paying quantities, the operator needed the non-operator's consent
before it could perform the procedure.' The operator's actions constituted a breach
of the 1982 Model Form Operating Agreement."'
X1II. Acreage or Cash Contributions
Each of the versions of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement
contains a provision dealing with the contribution of cash or acreage made toward
the drilling of a well or any operation on the lands subject to the joint operating
agreement. This provision establishes a method of handling such contributions
for the benefit of all parties who are participating in the drilling or other operation.
under the agreement.'
455. 809 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
456. d at 677.
457. Id.
458. Id
459. Id.
460. Ud
461. Id.
462. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VIII.C ("Acreage or Cash Contributions"); 1982 Model
Form, supra note 9, at art. VIII.C (same); 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VIII.C (same); 1956
Model Form, supra note 9, § 25 (same).
463. Id.
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A. Purpose of Acreage or Cash Contribution Provision
In Martin Exploration Co. v. Amoco Production Co.," the Louisiana Court of
Appeal discussed the underlying purpose of the acreage or cash contributions
provision of the Model Form Operating Agreement. Martin dealt specifically with
article VIII.C, "Acreage of Cash Contributions," of the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model
Form Operating Agreement.
In March 1980, Amoco and Gulf finalized a farmout agreement covering interests
in the "red acreage" in return for Amoco drilling a well in a unit that included this
acreage. In January and February 1981, after lengthy negotiations, Amoco and
MECO entered into a 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement covering, in part, the
"red acreage." The joint operating agreement went into effect January 1, 1980.
In April 1981, MECO made demand on Amoco for its alleged share of the "red
acreage" acquired by Amoco from Gulf. MECO asserted a claim to this share of the
"red acreage" based upon its participation in the drilling of the well on such acreage
under the joint operating agreement and article VIII.C, "Acreage or Cash
Contributions," of the operating agreement. Upon Amoco's refusal to tender the
interest, MECO instituted an action against Amoco alleging that Amoco breached the
1977 Model Form Operating Agreement.
MECO argued that the joint operating agreement, containing article VIII.C, was
effective as of January 1, 1980, and that the Amoco-Gulf farmout agreement was
executed in March 1980, subsequent to the effective date of the joint operating
agreement. Therefore, MECO claimed that the Amoco-Gulf farmout agreement
constituted an acreage contribution that Amoco had an obligation to share with
MECO under article VUI.C of the joint operating agreement.
Amoco asserted that pursuant to article III.B of the 1977 Model Form Operating
Agreement, the respective percentage or fractional interests of the parties were set out
in Exhibit A to the joint operating agreement. This exhibit showed Amoco with the
acreage farmed-in from Gulf and showed Gulf with no interest in the contract area
before payout of the well, but with an interest after payout, as provided for in the
farmout agreement.
The Louisiana Court of Appeal determined the 1977 Model Form Operating
Agreement to be clear, concise, and unambiguous.' Thus, the court did not
consider parol evidence in interpreting the agreement." The court rejected the
position of MECO, finding the position contrary to the purpose of article VIII.C of
the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement.61 In this regard, the court stated:
The purpose of the Contribution Clause is to protect the participants
of a joint operating agreement against the possibility that one of them
might obtain an undue advantage from an outsider at the expense of
those paying for the operations. Superior Oil Co. v. Cox, 307 So. 2d
464. 637 So. 2d 1202 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
465. d. at 1207.
466. Id.
467. Id.
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350, 355[, 50 O&GR 323, 3321 (La. 1975). Exhibit "A" set forth the
percentage of interests of each party under the agreement. Article 11I.B
provided that all costs and liabilities incurred in operations under the
agreement were borne and paid by the parties according to the interests
as shown in Exhibit "A." Likewise, all production of oil and gas was
owned by the parties in the same manner. Thus, without the Contribution
Clause, when one of the participants in the operating agreement receives
a contribution toward the operations from someone not a party to the
agreement, the recipient of the contribution profits at the expense of his
partners.
In the case at hand, regardless of the effective date of the operating
agreement, Amoco obtains no undue advantage because the red acreage
was clearly already a part of the contract area .... Amoco could not
have drilled this well on the red acreage unless they had previously
acquired the rights to that red acreage.
Also, Exhibit "A" reflects that the red acreage is already accounted for
in Amoco's percentage of interest. Thus, Amoco is bearing the costs of
the production of this well for its own acreage and for the red acreage
acquired from Gulf through the farmout agreement. Thus, no undue
advantage has been obtained by Amoco in this instance.'
Based on the above analysis the court concluded that MECO was not entitled to
share in the "red acreage" under the provisions of article VIII.C, "Acreage or Cash
Contributions," of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement. '
B. Acreage Received from Outsider as Incentive or Compensation for Drilling
As indicated above, the court in Martin relied, in part, upon the analysis set forth
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Superior Oil Co. v. Cox.4 In Superior Oil, the
court determined whether certain oil and gas leases acquired under a farmout
agreement were subject to section 25, "Acreage or Cash Contributions," of a 1956
AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement.
In analyzing section 25 of the joint operating agreement, the court noted that the
parties did not cite any authority interpreting this particular provision " The court
stated that if section 25 was clear and unambiguous, it would cover only acreage that
is acquired as an incentive toward, or compensation for, drilling a well!' In this
case, the court found that the rights to the oil and gas leases in question under the
farmout agreement did not mature until the Department of Conservation included the
acreage in a conservation or production unit that contained a producing well!' The
court concluded that under the facts involved, there was serious doubt that the farmee
468. Id. at 1207-08 (citations omitted).
469. Id. at 1208.
470. 307 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975).
471. Id. at 355.
472. Id. at 354.
473. Id.
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had received the interest in the oil and gas leases as either an incentive for drilling
the subject well or as compensation for drilling the subject welL'"
The court further stated that if section 25 of the 1956 Model Form Operating
Agreement served to protect the parties against the possibility that one of them might
obtain an undue advantage from an outsider at the expense of those paying for the
operations, the section had a legitimate function!' However, the court concluded
that the parties had not offered any reason why they would suffer if two or more of
them, but not all, reapportioned their ownership interests between themselves 6
The court concluded that if section 25 was clear and unambiguous, then such
provision did not apply in this case because (1) the leases in question were not
acquired by the farmee as a "contribution ... toward drilling a well," and (2) the
farmee's acquisition of the leases did not affect the other parties' proportionate
interests in the production from the unit, except as provided for in the prior contract
to assign.!" However, the court decided that the provisions of section 25 were, in
fact, unclear and ambiguous, stating:
The one clear idea, applicable to the case before us, to be drawn from
this discussion, is that "contributions" are made by outsiders - those not
party to the joint operating agreement. Only in this way - when one of
the participants in the joint operating agreement receives a contribution
toward the operations from someone not a party to the joint operating
agreement - does the function of the clause become clear. Only in this
way does the recipient of the "contribution" profit at the expense of his
partners.
Since the clause before us does not limit "contributions ... toward the
drilling of a well" to those made by outsiders, there are doubts about its
function and meaning.'
The court concluded that because of the uncertain nature of section 25 of the 1956
Model Form Operating Agreement, the court could rely upon the actions of the
parties in connection with the acquisition of the oil and gas leases to determine
whether the parties intended the acreage in question to be shared under the joint
operating agreement.' Based on the parties' actions, it appeared that the parties did
not contemplate that the leases in question would be considered an "acreage
contribution" under section 25 of the joint operating agreement.'
474. Id.
475. Id. at 355.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 356.
479. Id.
480. lid; see also Harper Oil Co. v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 733 P.2d 1313, 1316 (N.M. 1987)
(holding that article VIII.C, "Acreage or Cash Contributions," of the 1977 Model Form Operating
Agreement, when read in connection with article VI.B.2, "Operations By Less Than All Parties," and two
other nonuniform amendments to the agreement, rendered the joint operating agreement ambiguous).
2001]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
XIV. The Preferential Right to Purchase
All versions of the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement contain
a provision addressing the right of a party to the agreement to acquire the interest of
another party to the agreement when that other party desires to sell its interest subject
to the agreement.0 ' 1 While all of the versions of the Model Form Operating
Agreement contain a preferential right to purchase provision, the parties very often
strike this provision from the agreement.
In fact, the 1989 Model Form Operating Agreement attempts to incorporate this
industry practice of striking this provision by allowing the parties to check a box if
the parties want the preferential right to purchase provision to apply. If the parties
do not check the box, the preferential right to purchase provision does not apply.
Thus, the parties do not need to physically strike through the language in the form
agreement.
A. Conveyance of Interest Between Subsidiaries
In Questa Energy Corp. v. Vantage Point Energy, Inc.,4u the Texas Court of
Appeals considered whether the preferential right to purchase provision in article
VIII.G of the 1977 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement was
triggered by a conveyance of interests subject to the agreement between subsidiary
corporations of a parent corporation. In Questa, certain entities to the joint operating
agreement were wholly owned subsidiaries of a Canadian company. The Canadian
company decided to discontinue its operations in the United States and entered into
an agreement whereby the U.S. properties of the Canadian company, as held by the
wholly owned subsidiaries, would be conveyed to an Oklahoma corporation. In
exchange, a majority of the shares of the common stock of that Oklahoma
corporation would be issued to the Canadian company.
Plaintiff, who was not notified of the transaction, filed suit alleging that the
transaction triggered the plaintiffs rights under the preferential right to purchase
provision of the joint operating agreement. The trial court directed a verdict in favor
of the defendants.
In determining whether the transaction invoked the plaintiffs preferential right to
purchase, the Texas Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiff did not dispute that the
entities covered by the joint operating agreement were wholly owned subsidiaries of
the Canadian company!' The plaintiff also did not dispute that the transaction
included all of the interests in the properties covered by the Model Form Operating
Agreement, which the Canadian company owned through its subsidiaries. ' The
court concluded that the transaction effectively transferred the subject interests to the
481. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VIII.F ("Preferential Right to Purchase"); 1982 Model
Form, supra note 9, at art. VILI.F (same); 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VIII.G (same); 1956
Model Form, supra note, § 18 (same).
482. 887 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
483. Id. at 221.
484. Id.
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Oklahoma corporation, which, in turn, became a subsidiary of the Canadian company
by virtue of the stock transfer."'
Shifting its discussion to the joint operating agreement, the court specifically found
that article VIII.G of the 1977 Model Form Operating Agreement was unam-
biguous.'' Accordingly, the court sought to determine the intentions of the parties
by including this provision in the joint operating agreement.4 The court explained:
In an operating agreement, the preferential right to purchase serves two
purposes. First, it assures its holder an opportunity to acquire further
interests in a contract area. In joint operating agreements, each owner
believes that the other interests in the subject property are of some value.
The preferential right, therefore, assures each owner the opportunity to
purchase those valuable rights should a co-owner of an interest decide to
sell his interest to a third party. It thus allows those owners, who may
have been at risk in exploratory efforts which contributed to the
development of the property, to have an opportunity to acquire an
additional interest in the property before a third party who did not
participate in such risk.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the preferential right to
purchase ensures that the owners retaining their interest in the contract
area have some degree of control in excluding undesirable participants
who may not have the necessary financial ability to bear their share of
expenditures or who might frustrate development with management and
engineering philosophies which current owners oppose.""
In this case, the court determined that the "structure and working" of article VIII.G
evidenced the parties' intent to accomplish these two purposes.' Accordingly, the
court held that, prior to the transaction in question, subsidiaries of the Canadian
company held the interests covered by the Model Form Operating Agreement'
The transaction simply transferred those interests to another entity controlled by the
Canadian company rather than to an outside entity.49' Because the interests of the
Oklahoma corporation continued to be burdened with the preferential right to
purchase, the plaintiff was not exposed to the risk of an undesirable outsider holding
the interests.m ' Also, the plaintiff did not lose its potential opportunity to acquire
the interests if the Oklahoma corporation attempted to sell the interests to an
outsider 3 Thus, the court found that the transaction did not trigger the plaintiffs
rights under the preferential right to purchase provision of thejoint operating agreement.'
485. Id.
486. IX.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 222.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. d.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.; see also Marken v. Goodall, 478 F.2d 1052, 1055 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that the
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B. Rule Against Perpetuities Inapplicable
Another case discussing the preferential right to purchase provision is Producers
Oil Co. v. Gore 9 In Producers, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided the
following questions certified by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit:
(1) Does the Oklahoma Rule Against Perpetuities apply to the interest
created by the preemptive option provisions of the oil and gas lease
operating agreements [involved in the cause]?
(2) If the answer to the first question be in the affirmative, then, would
it be within the power of a court in Oklahoma to reform the described
provisions, either pursuant to statutory authority ... or under common
law cy pres powers, so as to save them from invalidity under the Rule
Against Perpetuities?
The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the rule against perpetuities does not
apply to contractual preemptive options in operating agreements covering oil and gas
leases!" The court reasoned that a preemptive right or right of first refusal differs
from an ordinary option because an ordinary option creates in the optionee a power
to compel the owner of the property to sell it at a stipulated price whether or not the
party is willing to sell!" A party cannot compel an owner to sell by virtue of a
preemptive right, or a right of first refusal.4  A preemptive right is triggered only
when, or if, an owner decides to sell, and then only obligates the owner to offer the
property first to the person holding the preemptive right.' Further, a preemptive
right only requires an owner to offer the property at the stipulated price or at a price
at which the owner would sell to a third party?" The preemptive party has the right
to elect whether it will buy the interest upon receiving notice of the proposed
sale .' If the preemptive party decides not to buy, the owner may sell to any third
party at the price of his choosing.'
plaintiff was barred by the doctrine of laches from asserting its preferential right to purchase an interest
because of the plaintiffs delay in asserting such right until after the acquiring party had successfully
completed a risky business venture that increased the value of the lease).
495. 610 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1980).
496. Id. While the preferential right to purchase provision at issue in Producers was not the specific
provision contained in the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement, the provision was similar
to the provision in the model form. The court in Producers stated that the most universally accepted
definition of the common law rule against perpetuities is that no interest in property is good unless it
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.
Id. at 774.
497. Id. at 773.
498. Id. at 773-74 (emphasis added).
499. Id. at 774.
500. id.
501. lit
502. kL
503. Id.
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically found that the preferential right to
purchase provision is generally held not to be a restraint on alienation. 4 An owner
may elect to sell at any time and the alienation is not hindered if no set price is made
a part of the preemption. Although the rule against perpetuities is intended, to
some extent, to prevent restrictions on alienation, it focuses on the duration of the
rights rather than absolute restraints.'
In this case, the court remarked that the subject oil and gas leases and the joint
operating agreement covering them had a built-in duration. Oil and gas produc-
tion cannot last indefinitely and the rights are always terminable.' 8 The preemptive
right in the joint operating agreement would last only as long as the leases covered
by the agreement remained in effect. If the leases expired, neither party would
have anything to convey under the right of preemption!"1 The court concluded that
the rule against perpetuities did not apply to the preferential right to purchase
provision in the joint operating agreement"
C. Preferential Right Not a Prohibition on Partition
In Komarec v. Perrine,"' the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered whether the
preferential right to purchase provision in a joint operating agreement included an
implied covenant not to partition the undivided interests in the oil and gas leases
subject to the joint operating agreement."'
Under the agreement, the court determined that no express provision in the
agreement prohibited the parties from seeking to partition in invitumn.5 Because
the joint operating agreement concerned the operation of certain oil and gas leases
instead of the disposition of those leases, the court found as follows: 'Generally
speaking, the law favors the partition of property held by cotenants .... courts are
adverse to any rule which compels unwilling persons to use their property in
common.... [and that] a denial of the remedy of partition can only be justified in
the most extreme cases . . . .,sl The court concluded that the preferential right to
purchase provision did not prevent the parties from seeking to partition the undivided
interests in the oil and gas leases covered by the joint operating agreement."6
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id
507. Id
508. Id.
509. Id. at 776.
510. Id
511. Id
512. 382 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1960).
513. It is not clear from the Komarec opinion whether the joint operating agreement was an AAPL
Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement. However, the court's description of the agreement is
similar conceptually to the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement.
514. Komarec, 382 P.2d at 750.
515. Id.
516. Id.
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Interestingly, the 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement does not contain any
provision dealing with a party's right to partition the interests covered by the joint
operating agreement. Subsequent to Komarec, the 1977, 1982, and 1989 Model Form
Operating Agreements contain a provision stating that, if permitted by the laws of the
applicable state, each party owning an undivided interest in the area covered by the
agreement waives any and all rights to partition and have set aside in severalty its
undivided interest therein.2
XV. Execution by Less than All Parties
A. Creation of Two Separate Agreements
In Osborn v. Rogers,5 1 the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined the effect of
the execution by two parties of a proposed joint operating agreement, with a third
party having deleted certain provisions from the form operating agreement.
In Osborn, three parties owned an interest in an oil and gas lease. The defendant
executed the original joint operating agreement covering the subject land, which
designated the plaintiff as the operator. Public Service Company of Tulsa (Public
Service) executed the joint operating agreement, but only after certain deletions had
been made to the agreement. The defendant did not sign or approve the deletions to
the joint operating agreement as made by Public Service.
In analyzing the relationship of the three parties, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
found that the parties had in essence created two separate joint operating agreements,
one between the plaintiff and the defendant and the other between the plaintiff and
Public Service."9 The court found that the rights of the defendant should be
determined under the operating agreement the defendant had signed without the
deletions made by Public Service.' Because there were two separate joint
operating agreements, there was no agreement between Public Service and the
defendant. Thus, in the plaintiffs action, the defendant could not claim the benefits
of the joint operating agreement between Public Service and the plaintiff with the
deleted provisions."
B. Agreement Binding on Signatory Parties
In IMCO Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp.,a plaintiff argued that a joint
operating agreement, which appears to be a 1956 Model Form Operating Agreement,
was not valid because while the agreement contained signature blocks for all of the
interest owners, the agreement was only executed by two of the parties. Plaintiff
asserted that a condition precedent existed that all of the listed parties must sign the
joint operating agreement before such agreement would become valid.
517. 1989 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VIII.E ("Waiver of Rights to Partition"); 1982 Model
Form, supra note 9, at art. VII.E (same); 1977 Model Form, supra note 9, at art. VIII.F.
518. 363 P.2d 219 (Okla. 1961).
519. Id. at 221.
520. Id. at 222.
521. Id.
522. 911 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
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The Texas Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs argument concerning the condition
precedent.' In analyzing the applicable operating agreement, the court pointed out
that such agreement expressly stated at the beginning, "'THIS AGREEMENT, entered
into this 6th day of March, 1972, between Westland Oil Development Corp.,
hereinafter designated as 'Operator' and the signatory parties other than
Operator."'" The court stated that the above quoted language expressly indicated
that the agreement became effective between those who chose to sign the document.
Such language modified the use of the word "parties" throughout the remainder of
the operating agreement to refer only to those who actually signed the agreement."
The court concluded that the agreement did not contain any condition precedent, and
was intended to become binding among those parties who signed the agreement.
The court explained that IMCO was not a party, either signed or unsigned, to the
applicable operating agreement. 6 The court noted that this was not a situation
where a signatory party to an agreement attempted to hold a non-signatory party
liable under the contract or vice versa."s The court found that IMCO, a complete
stranger to the applicable operating agreement, attempted to impose an implied
condition precedent into the agreement and argue what the parties intended, in spite
of the express language of the agreement.m The court concluded that the applicable
operating agreement did not contain any condition precedent and became effective
between the parties who actually signed the agreement.'
Conclusion
The numerous cases discussed or cited in this article demonstrate the growing
number of decisions concerning the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating
Agreement. This wealth of jurisprudence reflects the widespread use of the Model
Form Operating Agreement in the oil and gas industry. Most of the cases discussed
in this article have found the Model Form Operating Agreement to be clear,
unambiguous, and enforceable as drafted; these decisions should give some comfort
to the parties who must interpret and apply the provisions of the Model Form
Operating Agreement. Furthermore, these decisions upholding the enforceability of
various provisions serve as a tribute to the time and effort put in by the drafters of
the various versions of the Model Form Operating Agreement.
523. Id. at 920.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id. The 1989 AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement provides in article XV.A,
"Execution," that the operating agreement is binding upon a non-operator when the agreement has been
executed by such non-operator and the operator, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement is not then
or thereafter executed by all of the parties to whom the agreement is tendered or who are listed on
Exhibit A attached to the agreement as owning an interest in the contract area or who, in fact, own
interests in the contract area.
20011
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss2/2
